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**U S S R at the PARIS
PEACE CONFERENCE**

(July-October, 1946)

Selected Speeches of

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Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
USSR and Member of the Soviet
Delegation at the Conference



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THE PEACE TREATY WITH RUMANIA**Speech at the Plenary Session,****August 13, 1946**

WE have just heard the Rumanian delegation's statement, made by its chairman, M. Tatarescu, expounding the Rumanian Government's views and considerations, as well as certain criticisms and wishes, with regard to the draft Peace Treaty with Rumania. We greet the new democratic Rumania. We welcome her desire to redeem her guilty acts against the democratic countries which were attacked by Hitler Germany, whose ally she was. We welcome the determination of the Rumanian Government, a government which is a concentration of Rumania's democratic forces, to put an end forever to the sad legacy of the Fascist past, to all the remnants of Fascism, and to the Iron Guard, through whose agency a calamitous war was forced on the Rumanian nation by the criminal clique of Antonescu and his accomplices. The Rumanian Government, expressing the will of the Rumanian people, proceeds confidently along the path of democratisation, of the democratic transformation of their country. Steadily and persistently the Rumanian Government is working to solve this problem, in spite of considerable difficulties arising from the opposition launched by anti-democratic, anti-national reactionary forces, which are trying to thwart by every means, including sabotage and terror, the democratisation of Rumania and the democratic reforms effected by the present Rumanian Government.

The Rumanian Government is proceeding confidently along the path of consolidating friendly relations with its neighbours, so confirming its will to co-operate with all democratic, peace-loving countries.

On August 24, 1944, when the further course of hostilities was still not clear, and the fate of Hitler Germany was not yet manifest, Rumania wrought a decisive change in her foreign policy. She entirely ceased hostilities against the Soviet Union in all theatres of war, withdrew from the war against the United Nations, severed relations with Germany and her satellites, and entered the war against Germany and Hungary on the side of the Allied Powers. Under the terms of the Armistice Agreement of September 12, 1944, Rumania undertook to place in the field against our common enemy, the enemy of all the United Nations, no less than twelve army divisions, with all attached units. By this act she assisted the United Nations, and in the first place the

Soviet Union, which suffered more grievously than other countries the burden of armed invasion by Germany and her satellites.

The further course of military events confirmed the importance of the Rumanian people's step in over-throwing Hitler's agents, the government of Antonescu, in siding with the democratic countries and becoming an active participant in the struggle against Hitler Germany and her still-remaining satellites.

For nearly two years the Rumanian Government has conscientiously observed the Armistice Agreement, particularly those provisions relating to the democratisation of Rumania's social and governmental system. In those two years the Rumanian Government has carried out important measures such as the agrarian reform, as a result of which the peasants' land hunger has, in the main, been satisfied in Rumania. Hundreds of thousands of Rumanian peasants received land, and this could not fail to benefit the economy of Rumania as a whole.

A number of other democratic steps in the interests of the nation have been carried out in these two years. All this, together with the foreign policy of the Rumanian Government, proves the reality of its efforts to carry out, consistently and firmly, the democratic transformation of the country.

Rumania conscientiously discharges her obligations under the Armistice Agreement of September 12, particularly in regard to reparations. Justice requires that the calamities and sufferings inflicted on the peace-loving nations through the fault of Germany and her satellites should not be forgotten. The countries which provoked that war, and which waged that war, cannot and should not be relieved of responsibility for it. Similarly Rumania, who in alliance with Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. and brought calamities and war upon us, cannot and should not be relieved of responsibility for participating in the war against the Soviet Union and its Allies.

These are the requirements of justice, to which the vanquished countries should bow their heads. The interests of the countries which had to suffer armed aggression should be considered. That is why the draft Peace Treaties before this Conference contain articles and chapters which place upon the vanquished countries obligations of great political, economic and military importance.

On the other hand, Rumania's participation in the war against the Germans, even though in its last stage, and the fact that in August, 1944, she joined the United Nations, so expanding the front of the democratic countries fighting Hitler Germany, should also be taken into consideration.

The preamble to the Peace Treaty with Rumania takes account of all this in the appropriate place, namely in the third paragraph of the draft. The Soviet Government, however, does not restrict itself to a declaration in the sense in which it is

formulated in the preamble. In deciding such questions as reparations, or compensation for damage and losses, it proposes not only to satisfy the legitimate and just demands of countries which suffered aggression, but also not to lose sight of the national interests of the vanquished. This should particularly be borne in mind during the examination of the economic clauses of the draft Treaty, in particular such clauses as, for instance, the 24th, on which the Council of Ministers unfortunately failed to agree.

This clause says that Rumania should be regarded as responsible not only for direct damage caused by her participation in the war against the United Nations, but also for so-called indirect damage—in other words, that the principle of Roman law, “*Damnum emergens lucrum cessans*,” should be applied.

This is beyond the strength of the country concerned, under present conditions, and that was one reason why no agreement was achieved in the Council of Foreign Ministers, in view of the different approach to the problem of compensation. We should also mention Clauses 27 and 30, on which no agreement was reached in the Council of Foreign Ministers, and on which, as we hope, agreement will be reached at a later stage of our Conference.

The Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation expect, at least, that their well-founded and just attitude will be taken into account by the other delegations, and that it will prove possible to achieve agreement on this basis.

The main principle which guides the Soviet delegation to-day, and by which the Soviet Government was guided two years ago when concluding armistice agreements with Rumania, as well as with Germany's other former satellites, is that compensation of damage be restricted within certain limits; that so-called compensation be partial, because in view of the objective conditions and objective situation of the countries which caused damage to the United Nations by participating in the war against them, it is impossible to demand full compensation, and to believe that they would be able to comply with such a demand. To present impossible demands is as unfair as it is unreasonable. The Soviet delegation is advancing the same demand for partial compensation of damage by other vanquished countries. This demand is a just one as applied to Rumania, as well as to Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Its principle is just as applied to the Soviet Union's demands, as well as to demands emanating from others in the United Nations' camp.

This principle has guided the Soviet Union during the past two years, in granting Rumania a number of privileges, in view of her objective situation, when she was discharging the obligations imposed on her by the Armistice Agreement of September 12, 1944. I refer to the extension of the reparations period from six to eight years, and to the implementation of the most important

articles, such as for instance Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Armistice Agreement.

In the declaration of the representative of the Rumanian Government the Soviet delegation fails to detect any contention of principles requiring reply, or correction, or any special remark. The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that the Rumanian Government is determinedly making clear the way for their country to join the family of democratic countries and peace-loving peoples. Since Rumania has made a clean sweep of her old policy, both external and internal, and is treading a new path, consistently democratising her social and political system, all of us should strive to see that this is reflected in the draft Peace Treaty, so as to facilitate her efforts to tread a new path, and to secure good-neighbourly relations with Rumania, who is seeking co-operation and friendship with all democratic countries.

II
THE PEACE TREATY WITH HUNGARY
Spëech at the Plenary Session,
August 15, 1946

WE have heard here a number of remarks in connection with the statement made yesterday by the Hungarian delegation on the draft Peace Treaty which forms the subject at present under discussion at the Conference.

I have taken the floor to formulate certain considerations on this subject in the name of the Soviet delegation. The previous speaker, the representative of the U.S. delegation, preferred—although quite belatedly—to take advantage of this opportunity to return to the problem of Italy and to touch as a whole on more general questions, in particular those connected with the procedure of our Conference. Certainly every speaker may choose whatever path he thinks best. No objection can be raised to this, provided this path really leads forward and not backward. In the latter case, such a method of work cannot be regarded as fortunate or as promising the success of the Conference. It therefore appears to me that there is no need to deal with all that Mr. Byrnes said about procedure, and about Italy, Greece and a whole series of other questions.

As to Mr. Byrne's remarks attacking the Soviet delegation, I do not intend to dwell on them and do not propose to enter into polemics with him on this subject, since this will best be done when the opportunity arises by the leader of the Soviet delegation, V. M. Molotov.

I wish to deal with questions immediately connected with the Peace Treaty with Hungary, and in the first place with its economic clauses on which we failed to reach agreement in the Foreign Ministers' Council.

Incidentally, and without going into details, I would like to dwell for a moment on the question of why agreement was not reached upon these clauses—why the Foreign Ministers' Council, in the course of persistent work and thrashing out of opinions concerning the draft treaties with former enemy countries, was able to reach agreement on several rather difficult and acute problems, but yet failed to agree on a single important clause of an economic nature. Why? If the principle defended here by the U.S. delegation, and generally supported by the British and certain other delegations as well, is actually so beneficial and so fair, why did it prove impossible for the Foreign Ministers' Council to agree on economic clauses on the basis of this principle?

The Soviet delegation holds that in deciding questions of the economic demands to be presented to a vanquished country, we must bear in mind a whole series of very important circumstances.

Amongst such important circumstances the Soviet delegation places the economic obligations already assumed by such a country, which are recorded in the Armistice Agreement and are naturally bound to find a place in the draft Peace Treaties.

Indeed, it would be extremely unreasonable to pursue, in regard to former enemy countries, any policy that did not reckon with the obligations already assumed by them, but instead presented them with ever new supplementary demands, without considering the situation and the real sources from which such demands could be met. This would be a poor policy, capable only of causing misunderstanding and aggravations, instead of positive results.

This is the position of principle taken up by the Soviet delegation in relation to important economic problems.

This principle has already been repeatedly formulated by the Soviet delegation, which relieves me of the necessity of repeating what we have already said. I shall only remind you in a few words that this principle requires that economic demands be formulated with due consideration, on the one hand to those obligations which have already been imposed on the country concerned, and on the other hand to its real economic situation.

The Soviet Union has a legitimate and indisputable right to demand full compensation for damage caused to it by the war launched by some other enemy country. This is our right, our legitimate right, and we can demand it in full—demand full payment for the damage caused to our country by former enemy States. Apart from this formal right, however, there also exists the sentiment of justice. We are defending this principle. Unfortunately not all the delegations which took part in the preparation of the draft Peace Treaties for the present Conference agree to this principle or proceed from it. This is one of the main causes of the differences which prevented the Foreign Ministers' Council from reaching agreement on the economic clauses to be adopted at the present Conference. One cannot refuse to consider the objective conditions, the facts—because it is well known that facts are stubborn things, and that they have a way of turning against those who fail to take them into account.

In the draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, just as in the draft treaties with other former enemy countries, the Soviet Union proceeds precisely from this principle. When formulating our economic demands to Hungary we were bound to proceed, and we did proceed, from the real conditions, from the real economic situation of Hungary? What is this economic situation? Can one present additional economic demands to Hungary without reckoning how Hungary is coping with the obligations already

assumed under the Armistice Agreement? In our opinion only one answer can be given to this question, and that answer is in the negative. One cannot fail to reckon with this, it is impossible not to reckon with it. The Soviet Union duly reckons with it, and this is reflected in the trend of Soviet reparations policy.

What is the peculiar feature of Soviet reparations policy, in particular as regards Hungary?

It is evident in a number of instances. In 1945 Hungary was to have delivered to the Soviet Union goods to the amount of 33.5 million dollars on account of reparations, but actually delivered goods to the amount of 10 million dollars—that is, less than 30 per cent. of her obligations. And yet the obligations assumed by Hungary were not formulated unilaterally by the Soviet Union. They were presented by the three Great Powers, who also signed them. Consequently these Powers cannot treat the observance of these obligations with indifference. This is the formal state of affairs. In substance, however, the situation is different. It is well known that the Soviet Union and Hungary have concluded a trade treaty, under which the Soviet Union delivered to Hungary goods to the sum of 6.3 million dollars but itself received from Hungary goods to the amount of only 22,000 dollars. One must take this fact into account, as well as the fact that instead of the 33.5 million dollars that Hungary was required to pay on account of reparations in the last two years, she delivered goods to the total amount of 10 million dollars and at the same time received from the U.S.S.R. 6.3 million dollars worth of goods. Thus in the final analysis, instead of 33.5 million dollars, the Soviet Union received goods worth only 3.7 million dollars. When speaking of Hungary's reparations payments one cannot fail to take this fact into consideration. To understand Soviet policy regarding Hungary's economy, the following also should be borne in mind. Hungary recently sent the Soviet Union a request for additional facilities in the matter of reparations. Hungary proposed an eight-year programme for reparations payments, and the Soviet Government lengthened the term of deliveries from six to eight years. Hungary proposed that in the first year she should deliver goods to the value of 21 million dollars, in the second year 23 million dollars, in the third year 25 million dollars, and so on. The Soviet Government met the wishes of the Hungarian Government and adopted this plan in full. Incidentally, the American representative generally objects to reparations by Hungary, referring to the grave economic conditions in Hungary which are allegedly due to the fact that she undertook to pay reparations to the Soviet Union. An amazing picture! Hungary agrees to pay reparations, and the Allies who signed the Armistice Agreement obliging Hungary to pay reparations now object to reparations. Moreover, objecting even to partial compensation for damage to the Soviet Union, they de-

mand full compensation for their own damage. In the latter case, they forget Hungary's economic situation.

The Soviet Government consistently pursues a reparations policy proceeding from a realistic basis, aiming not to strangle Hungary, not to cut the roots of her economic revival, but to help her to rise to her own feet, to join the common family of the United Nations and to take part in the economic rehabilitation of Europe. This is a correct policy and a correct position. If our colleagues at this Conference had adopted the same position, the economic clauses for Hungary would undoubtedly have been agreed to, and the Peace Treaty with Hungary could provide a new instrument for the elimination of the grave consequences of the war. This Peace Treaty could satisfy the just demands of the victor countries while at the same time taking into account the needs of the vanquished.

We are told of the grave economic conditions in Hungary. But their causes are explained wrongly. This is an important problem and we cannot pass over it. In reality the grave financial position of Hungary is caused by her expenditure in the war against the United Nations and by the devastation of the country by the Germans and by her own former rulers. This should not be forgotten, just as we cannot forget that one of the important causes of Hungary's grave economic plight is the fact that a tremendous amount of Hungarian property was carried away by the Germans and Szalasi's men. This property was found in the American Zone, and so far as we know has not yet been restored to Hungary. The loss of this property will without a doubt hamper considerably the process of Hungary's economic rehabilitation. One should not overlook this.

From the statement of the Hungarian delegation you have heard that up to now two-thirds of the entire rolling-stock of the Hungarian railways has not been returned to Hungary. As is known, these two-thirds of the Hungarian railway rolling-stock are in the American zone. Why have they not yet returned to Hungary this railway rolling-stock, without which we certainly cannot think seriously of any restoration or improvement of economic conditions in the country? No plans for economic construction can be drafted in the absence of transport. One cannot tender economic assistance and boast of it on the one hand, and at the same time withhold transport and refuse the practical possibility of restoring the normal functioning of such main arteries of the whole economic structure as communications, and in the first place the railways. It is claimed here that the whole of Europe has been benefited. In reality matters should not be brought to such a pass that the whole of Europe has to beg alms with outstretched hands. We should not allow the right hand to write a plus sign while the left is writing two minuses.

Whatever attention is shown to Hungary by wealthy foreign states, it remains a fact that two-thirds of the Hungarian rolling-

stock has been carried away and not returned, and that without transport all rehabilitation and healing of the wounds of war remain out of the question.

In conclusion I would like to say a word concerning what M. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak representative said about the Hungarian delegation's statement. The Soviet delegation believes that M. Masaryk raised important questions concerning the relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and that these questions should be studied with full attention during the discussion and preparation of the draft Peace Treaty with Hungary. The Soviet delegation is giving and will give due attention to these questions, will study them and take part in their solution.

III
THE QUESTION OF ALBANIA
Speech at the Plenary Session,
August 10, 1946

THE Soviet delegation deems it necessary to deal with certain questions which have been raised on this tribune by the representatives of various delegations. First of all I would like to deal with that part of the speech of the British representative, Mr. Alexander, in which he touched upon the question of the partisan struggle of the Albanian people. He referred in this connection to the partisan struggle in Poland and stressed that there existed a certain difference between that movement and the partisan movement in Albania. Mr. Alexander pointed out that Poland had fought against Fascism since 1939 and that her soldiers, seamen, airmen and partisans took part in this struggle. Mr. Alexander is right in this respect. It is a fact, an indisputable fact, representing a very great historical service of the Polish people. But while recognising with full justice the service of the Polish people, is it necessary to belittle the significance of the partisan movement in Albania? If we are going to talk about dates, it is a fact that the partisan movement in Albania began long before the Polish partisans joined the struggle. Back in April, 1939, Albanian partisan detachments were attacking the Italians.

Mr. Alexander supports his objections to the proposal of the Yugoslav delegation by stating that the partisan movement in Albania allegedly gives no grounds, while the partisan movement in other countries and in Poland gives such grounds. One must admit that this argument of Mr. Alexander is obviously weak. Nor is this the only argument distinguished by such a quality.

It is well known that Albania was one of the first victims of Fascist aggression in Europe. She was abandoned to her fate by the government of King Ahmet Zog. But, abandoned to its fate, this heroic people found its leadership, advanced its heroes, raised the banner of struggle against the invaders and brilliantly waged an unequal struggle. By its determination and loyalty to to the cause of the freedom-loving nations the little Albanian people, together with the Allies, wrote glorious pages of the history of the heroic struggle and victory over the common enemy.

In 1939 the Albanian people, arms in hand, met the landing of the Italian occupation forces in the territory of Albania. In spite of the fact that King Zog called upon the people to submit to the

invaders the Albanians armed themselves and attacked the enemy in the rear and at the front wherever it was possible.

I will cite just a few facts. On April 5, 6 and 7, 1939, 15,000 Albanian patriots fought heroically against the Italian Fascists in the towns of Durazzo, Valona and other places all along the Adriatic coast. The patriots were suppressed by the Fascist war machine, but the struggle never ceased. In the very first days of the occupation in 1939, five partisan detachments more than 3,000 strong were fighting in the Albanian mountains against Fascism. This was not much, but it already represented the first sign of those increasing military blows which the little Albanian people showered subsequently upon the foreign invaders.

The occupationists never succeeded in suppressing the Albanian people's will to struggle. Quisling governments created by the Italians went into retirement one after another because they could find no support among the people, because they were anti-popular governments. The blockade of towns and large centres established by the invaders only served to increase the popular anger. The people took to the mountains, formed new partisan detachments, disrupted telegraph lines and communications, destroyed the enemy's manpower. In 1941 the partisan struggle in Albania became widespread.

In 1942, 10,000 men were operating in 40 partisan units. In 1944 a regular army of the Albanian people, an army of 70,000 strong, was already fighting against the enemy. Here are facts which should not be forgotten, which should be taken into account when we talk about the struggle of the Albanian people against the German and Italian Fascist hordes. The scale of the popular movement should be taken into account when we talk of the responsibility of this or that country for a government which plunged that country into war against the United Nations on the side of the Italian and German aggressors.

The contribution made by the Albanian people to the common cause of the Allied States in the struggle against the Germany of Hitler and the Italy of Mussolini is indisputable, and merits high recognition.

We heard yesterday how the Governments of Great Britain and the U.S.A. appraised the struggle of the Albanian people. I would like to recall how this struggle was appraised by the Soviet Government. This will help one to understand more clearly why now, too, the Soviet Government expresses its sympathy with Albania, being consistent and upholding the position maintained at that time regarding Albania.

In December, 1942, the Soviet Government declared that it was convinced that the struggle of the Albanian people for its independence would merge with the liberation struggle of other Balkan peoples oppressed by Italy, and that they, in alliance with all freedom-loving peoples, would eject the invaders from their land.

These words were fully borne out. The struggle of the Albanian people actually did merge with the struggle of all freedom-loving peoples against the oppressors, and resulted in victory. And now upon this rostrum comes the representative of the present Greek Government, Mr. Tsaldaris, and attempts to slander Albania by stating that she did not participate in the common struggle of the Allies against the foreign enemy. If Mr. Tsaldaris' speech were analysed, it could easily be seen that each of its contentions is in contradiction to the facts.

For instance, Mr. Tsaldaris says that Albania permitted Italian troops to occupy the country without any resistance. But this is not true. The facts I have just quoted are indisputable. For six years the Albanian people waged a struggle against the invaders and achieved victory. Mr. Tsaldaris substitutes the Albanian Government for Albania. But the former Albanian Government which meekly served the Italians was not the Albanian people. By no means can one always say that a government is the people and that the actions of the government are the actions of the people. These different notions should not be confused. You, Mr. Tsaldaris, representative of the Greek Government, should understand this better than anyone else.

Mr. Tsaldaris allowed himself to say from this high rostrum that the Albanian people voluntarily helped the aggressors. Where are your facts? You declared in your memoranda that some people had carried away 16 Greek citizens to their territory. But if such facts are taken into account, one could cite whole mountains of documents concerning Greek frontier incidents, when Greek gendarmes and frontier guards not only kidnapped a considerable number of people and carried them off to Greek territory, but these people also vanished without trace.

In order to calumniate the Albanian people, Mr. Tsaldaris contended that in Albania there existed no partisan movement, no national anti-Fascist movement which became the basis for the organisation of the Albanian Army. He said that the Allies simply tried to stimulate a national movement in Albania as they did in Germany. This contention does not stand criticism.

Mr. Tsaldaris tries to assert that even the regular troops in Albania were created by the Allies. Had he said this about Greece, I would not have argued; but to say it about Albania is crudely to distort the facts. Finally, Mr. Tsaldaris resorted to the following oratorical trick: he said that Greece could not forget the services rendered by Albania to the aggressor. He referred to the statement of the head of the Soviet delegation, Molotov, that impunity means refusal to defend the rights of States which had suffered from aggression. These words are perfectly just, and express our stand on all questions related to the problem of responsibility. But one cannot draw from this the inference which is drawn by Mr. Tsaldaris. To do so is to confuse the Albanian

people, the Albanian government, and Albania as a country, without making any distinction between the three.

In conclusion, I would like to deal with the proposal of the British delegation to refer the question of the invitation of Albania to the General Committee. Just why to the General Committee? What is the General Committee? The rules of procedure which constitute the regulations of our Conference say that the General Committee is called upon to help the work of the Conference, to co-ordinate the work of the various committees. But this is not a matter of co-ordination or committees. What we have to deal with is a serious question of principle which must be decided by the Conference itself. This is why the Soviet delegation objects to referring the Albanian question to the General Committee.

They say that the Soviet delegation demands that the question of Albania be decided before the question of other countries which have asked to be permitted to participate in this Conference. This does not correspond to fact, since the Soviet delegation only said that since the question of Albania had been put on the agenda it must be decided here, without tying it up with other questions in order to leave it undecided.

The viewpoint of the Soviet delegation is just that we want to decide this question since it has been put on the agenda, whereas our opponents propose that this question should not be solved although it has been put on the agenda. If they do this, guided by definite interests, and if you regard this as logical—well, act as you think fit. We believe it to be wrong, and will object to it.

IV

AUSTRIA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Speech at the Plenary Session,

August 17, 1946

THE Soviet delegation cannot agree to the British proposal to invite representatives of the Austrian Government to the Conference. Contrary to the opinion of the British delegation, the Soviet delegation believes that Austria's request should be turned down, as it sees no reason to comply with it. It is a fact that during discussion of the question of inviting representatives of Albania, Egypt, Cuba and Mexico to the Conference, the British delegation already proposed that Austria also be invited. This proposal met with no support in the Conference, and attention was called to the fact that the Conference did not have at its disposal any documents which would justify to any extent whatever this request of the Austrian Government.

Albania, Egypt, Cuba and Mexico in their notes and memoranda had all stated in detail the grounds on which they claimed a right to be invited and heard at the Conference. Austria acted in an entirely different manner when she submitted a letter consisting of several lines without explaining her motives. This letter merely states that Austria feels it necessary to be heard in regard to the Austro-Italian frontier. One could not call this convincing.

No other materials were received from Austria on this subject, and thus nothing has changed in this respect since the day the British delegation first raised the question of inviting representatives of Austria to the Conference along with representatives of Albania, Cuba, Mexico, and Egypt. In this matter we are exactly where we were several days ago.

In his speech, Mr. McNeil evidently intended to correct this shortcoming. The British delegate tried to do what the Austrian Government had failed to do. Mr. McNeil said here that Austria has a common border with Italy and is, therefore, immediately concerned in the Peace Treaty with her. He said that Cuba and Mexico are less concerned in the Peace Treaty with Italy than Austria is and that, therefore, Austria, being more concerned than Mexico and Cuba, should be admitted to the Conference since the latter were already admitted. Lastly, Mr. McNeil referred to the fact that Albania, though not a member of UNO, had also been admitted to the Conference.

It should be said that Mr. McNeil's arguments failed to convince us of anything. I believe that they cannot convince anybody. It is said that Austria has a common border with Italy.

Very well. Austria has indeed a common border with Italy. But firstly, the draft Peace Treaty with Italy submitted for the consideration of the Conference does not alter in any way that frontier or the existing status quo. It is well known that the draft Peace Treaty states plainly that the Austro-Italian border of January 1, 1938, remains unchanged. Hence the draft Peace Treaty does not infringe in any way on Austria's interests.

Certainly, Austria, has certain claims against Italy. The Soviet delegation, however, believes that it is impermissible to bring up such claims for examination at this Conference, since the Peace Conference which is now meeting in Paris to examine draft peace treaties with five former enemy countries, must not engage in examination of the claims of any states against whomsoever they might arise. And this, moreover, cannot be otherwise if we do not lose sight of the peculiar features of Austria's position. These features should be recalled.

Indeed, the Declaration on Austria of the Governments of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Great Britain in October, 1943, noted that Austria must bear the responsibility from which an accomplice of Hitlerite Germany cannot escape, and that during the final settlement of questions involving Austria her own contribution to the cause of liberation would inevitably be considered.

What does this Declaration say? Firstly, it raises the question of Austria's responsibility for participation in the war against the United Nations on the side of Hitlerite Germany. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation this responsibility is augmented by the fact that Austria remained on the side of Hitlerite Germany down to the very last. It is well known that Vienna was captured by Red Army troops on April 13, 1945, after bloody battles which cost Soviet troops heavy losses as a result of the violent resistance offered, along with the German Army, by Austrian troops under their German commanders. It is well known that only three weeks separated the day of the fall of Vienna from that of the fall of Berlin. We are, therefore, justified in asserting that Austria remained on Hitler's side right up to the end of the war. This, despite the Declaration on Austria in which the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States urged Austria to dissociate herself, to separate, to break away from Germany and to side with the United Nations and warned her of the responsibility she would bear if she continued to fight against the United Nations on Hitler's Side. Although the three Ministers' declaration stated that Austria's contribution to the cause of her own liberation would inevitably be considered during the final settlement, she did nothing in order really to make this contribution to the cause of her liberation, to the cause of the common liberation struggle against Hitlerite Germany and her accomplices.

Consequently, there arises the legitimate question: in what

capacity could Austria be invited to the present Conference? All of us know that Austria was the first victim of Hitlerite aggression and that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A. made her liberation from German rule one of their tasks. Certainly, this circumstance places Austria in a special position as compared to other countries which, together with Germany, launched war against the United Nations. But even with due consideration to these circumstances, one cannot recognise Austria's right to demand that the present Conference engage in examining the Austria Government's territorial claims against any other states and, in particular, against Italy.

The task of the Paris Conference is to discuss the draft peace treaties which are to be concluded between the United Nations and Germany's former satellites who were at war with the United Nations—Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The task of the Paris Conference is thus to settle relations with those states and conclude peace treaties with them for this purpose.

In this connection, the Paris Conference must examine a number of problems which form the contents of the said peace treaties or which are immediately connected with those treaties. The Peace Conference may and should be interested only in those questions which concern relations between the United Nations on the one hand and the five former enemy countries who were in a state of war with the United Nations on the other. Such is the task of this Conference.

This Conference should not and cannot engage in considering questions which go beyond the limits of its tasks—tasks connected with the preparation of peace treaties for the five states listed above. This is the firm conviction of the Soviet delegation. Quite obviously, an examination of claims presented by states which were not in a state of war with those enemy countries is outside the scope of this Conference. Austria was not in a state of war with Italy. Austria was Hitler's ally to the end, an ally of the main author of this war. Austria and Italy were not in a state of war with each other. Hence there is no reason to discuss at the Present Conference in Paris the mutual claims of these two countries.

If we accept the viewpoint of the British delegation, the Paris Conference ought to take up the mutual claims of the countries which were in the enemy camp in the struggle against the United Nations.

Is this the purpose for which our Conference was called? It suffices to pose this question in order to see quite clearly that it is not the task of the Paris Conference to examine the territorial claims with which the Austrian Government intends to take up our time. The Austrian Government may have and evidently does have claims against Italy. But this has nothing to do with the present Conference. Let Austria present these claims elsewhere

and not at this Conference, as examination of such problems does not form its task.

We may be told, as Mr. McNeil has told us, that Cuba and Mexico have been invited to express their views at this Conference, although they are less interested in the treaty with Italy than is Austria. But Cuba and Mexico are members of UNO. I believe that neither Mr. McNeil nor anyone else will deny certain elementary facts which prove the right of Cuba and Mexico to state their views at this Conference concerning the various parts of the clauses of the peace treaties. Firstly, they are members of UNO; secondly they were in a state of war with Italy; and thirdly, they made certain sacrifices in this war. These sacrifices may not have been great, the services rendered by those states to the common cause of the struggle against the enemy may not have been as decisive as others claims for themselves, but in any case the fact remains: all states additionally invited to the Conference were enemies of our enemies. And it would be strange if Mr. McNeil tried to deny such facts. We hold that Austria cannot compare with Cuba or Mexico. Austria can by no means be placed alongside these members of UNO, no matter how much Mr. McNeil may try to justify this here.

Albania is called into question since she was not a member of UNO. But Mr. McNeil has either forgotten or refuses to reckon with the fact that Albania actively fought against Italy and that a whole article in our draft peace treaty with Italy is devoted to Albania. This should not be forgotten. If you open the draft peace treaty with Italy you will see that the entire fifth article deals with the question of Albania—clauses 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 deal with Albania. How, then, in these circumstances, could we refrain from inviting Albania here, since these clauses deal with questions of importance to her, affecting her vital interests? To my mind this is indisputable, and I need not prove this obvious truth, since Conference has taken the decision to invite Albania and we are bound to respect this decision.

And what is Austria's situation in this respect? Is there a single clause affecting the interests of Austria in the draft Peace Treaty with Italy? No, there is not a single clause. There is only one, clause 10, which I consider it necessary to bring to the attention of those who defend the proposal of inviting Austria. Clause 10 states that Italy will conclude or confirm an agreement with Austria in order to guarantee free passenger and freight traffic between Northern and Eastern Tyrol.

But in order to confirm an agreement on railway traffic between Austria and Eastern Tyrol there is absolutely no need to set in motion the entire machinery of our Conference. I must add, moreover, that this is one of the questions to be settled by way of a bilateral treaty. That is what clause 10 says. In substance, this clause settles nothing, and, consequently, it cannot affect Austria's interests in the least. Lawyers call clauses like

clause 10 "reference" clauses; as they only refer one to some procedure for settling a question—in the given case it refers to settlement by means of a bilateral treaty. This is perfectly logical and correct because the regulation of railway traffic in the area of the Austro-Italian frontier has not, nor should have, anything to do with the problems being discussed at the Paris Conference.

We are told, however, that Austria has claims against Italy in regard to Southern Tyrol. We have been reminded of the fact that this problem was discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers and that since the Council of Foreign Ministers gave attention to this question, the Peace Conference, too, must give it attention. This is rather surprising logic. I should arrive at a different conclusion: precisely because this problem was discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers and met with no support there, the Council unanimously rejecting Austria's claim to Southern Tyrol, the Conference should not take up this problem. We have no reason to encumber the work of the Conference with unnecessary problems. By the way, much is being said about accelerating the work of the Conference. We should indeed save time. This is also one of the reasons why Austria should not be invited. Indeed, what right has the Conference to spend time on examining the Austrian Government's claims to Southern Tyrol, which Austria claims at the expense of Italy, trying to make use of the Paris Conference to alter the St. Germain Treaty of 1919? Austria claims new lands. But I am asking—as a reward for what? As a prize for what efforts in the struggle of the democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany? There were no such efforts and there is no ground for raising this question. Evidently this was what the Council of Foreign Ministers thought when it declined Austria's claims.

In order not to make groundless statements, I shall only mention what was the conclusion of the Council of Foreign Ministers' discussion of the Southern Tyrol problem which Austria, assisted by the British delegation, is now trying to bring up again here at the Peace Conference, diverting us without any justification from our basic tasks. To remind you how this discussion ended in the Council of Foreign Ministers, I shall quote my record of the Council's meeting of June 24 this year. Here it is: "At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the problem of the Austro-Italian border V. M. Molotov made the following proposal:

Having considered the report of the committee of experts on the problems of hydro-electric power in connection with the Austrian claim for an 'insignificant alteration' of the frontier in the north-eastern part of Alto Adige (Southern Tyrol), the Council of Foreign Ministers cannot recognise the said Austrian claim as an 'insignificant alteration' as claimed in the memorandum of the general Government of Austria of May 30, 1946."

Further, my record says:—

“Mr. Byrnes stated that the U.S. delegation can agree with the proposal made by the Soviet delegation.”

And it continues:—

“M. Bidault said that he could not regard the claims of the Austrian Government as insignificant. The Council of Foreign Ministers had no reason to deprive Italy of considerable electric power resources in the northern part of the Southern Tyrol. In that area electric power resources were not as small as in the area of Tendabriga claimed by France.”

Mr. Bevin said that the British delegation accepted the proposal of the Soviet delegation, but at the same time he wanted to express the hope that Italy and Austria would arrive at a reasonable agreement on the utilisation of the railways linking the Eastern part of the Austrian Tyrol with its Northern part.

Thus all four delegations unanimously recognised, firstly, that Austria's claims against Italy are in substance unacceptable, secondly, that the Council of Foreign Ministers was by no means prepared to admit that the alterations of the frontier were insignificant ones, thirdly, that in view of all this Austria's request should be declined.

This is how matters stand.

After all this I ask the Conference—what legal, political and, I would say, moral political reasons exist for inviting Austria to this Conference? The Soviet delegation answers this question with one firm and emphatic word—none.

V

REPARATIONS FROM ITALY

Speech at the Committee on Economic Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy,

August 28, 1946

YESTERDAY the head of the Soviet delegation, V. M. Molotov, speaking as representative of the Soviet Union, set forth exhaustively the considerations upon which the Soviet delegation considers the amendments of the Australian delegation to be unacceptable, harmful and requiring unquestionable rejection. I should not have asked to speak today if there had not been some statements at this session which obliged the Soviet delegation to present further observations on this subject.

We have been again reminded here that reparations ought to be fixed in accordance with the principles of justice, not only towards those who have a legitimate right to reparations for the damage caused by a war which was forced upon them, but also towards those who are answering for the damage which was done. This principle is just, and the draft decision on the question of reparations brought forward by the Council of Foreign Ministers is fully in keeping with it. As regards the proposal of the Australian delegation, it contradicts that principle. Not only is it formal and abstract: it takes no account of the need to be just first and foremost to the countries which have suffered. It does not give the minimum satisfaction to the peoples who have suffered from aggression.

The Soviet delegation insists on the rejection of the Australian delegation's proposal precisely because it is unjust.

What is involved? Why does the Australian delegation think the Council of Foreign Ministers' proposal unacceptable? Which parts of it are unacceptable, and why? The representative of Australia did not let fall a single word on this subject.

The Council of Foreign Ministers suggests that Italy should pay the Soviet Union 100 million dollars. I ask the Australian delegation, does it move any amendment to this sum? Does it consider that in the name of justice there should be paid, not 100 million dollars, but 500 million dollars? Or does it consider that there should be paid, not 100 millions to make good losses 20 times exceeding that sum which were caused by the Italian Fascists during their three years' sojourn on Soviet soil, but 10 million dollars? Or perhaps the Australian delegation considers that the Soviet Union should not be paid anything at all? But the Australian delegation is silent, and is hardly likely to propose

any figure whatsoever. Most probably, as already happened at the Territorial Committee when the question of the Italian frontiers was being discussed, it will make use of its favourite method of postponement, appointment of a commission, investigation, since forsooth "we know nothing, understand nothing, and because of this can decide nothing."

We consider that the question is clear. For three years the Italian brigands remained on the territory of the Soviet Union. They plundered, wrecked, burned Soviet property and killed Soviet people. It would take milliards of roubles to make good all this damage. But the Soviet Union, inspired by feelings of compassion and magnanimity, names a figure of 100 million dollars. This sum is more a symbol of punishment of the aggressor than a real compensation for damage.

Compare the demand of the U.S.S.R. with the demands of other States. Take Greece. We grieve together with the Greek people over the painful losses and damage inflicted on it by this cruel war. With the object of making good this damage, Greece has defined her reparations demands, in a document presented in November, 1945, as a sum of 2,877 million dollars. But can there really be any doubt that the Soviet Union's losses were incomparably greater than those of Greece? And if Greece demands 2 milliard 877 million dollars to make good her losses, what in comparison with this is the demand for 100 million dollars presented by the Soviet Union? Is the Soviet Union's demand just or unjust? Unquestionably it is just—or if not, only in respect of the U.S.S.R., which is entitled to a much greater sum than 100 million dollars to make good the losses it has suffered. But the Soviet Union is magnanimous and merciful.

Take Ethiopia. We grieve deeply with the Ethiopian people over its losses, and are ready in every way to support Ethiopia, as any other country which experienced the invasion of the Italian bandit hordes. In order to try and make good its heavy losses and render more easy its economic restoration, what demand did Ethiopia present? In September 1945 she presented her claims upon Italy to a sum of 775 million dollars. I think there is no doubt that the Soviet Union suffered no less than Ethiopia: yet we are asking not for 775 million dollars but only for 100 millions. Is that just or not? Unquestionably it is just—and if not, then it is unjust only in respect of the U.S.S.R. But the Soviet Union is magnanimous and merciful.

Take Egypt. On June 18, 1945, Egypt presented Italy with a claim for reparations amounting to more than 500 million dollars—five times more than the Soviet Union is demanding. But did the Soviet Union really suffer less from the incursion of the Italian bands than Egypt did? Mexico is demanding 50 million dollars. But did the Soviet Union really suffer losses which were only twice as great as those of Mexico?

Yet it is not a question of these 100 millions, but of the prin-

ciple of punishing the aggressor through his pocket—so that he should remember, and his posterity should remember, what it means to wage an aggressive war against peace-loving peoples!

Let the gentleman from Australia think over these facts and weigh them up: they are as irrefutable as life and death themselves. This demand for 100 million dollars should not have been made subject to discussion here: it ought to have been adopted here without voting, by acclamation, as a sign of respect and homage to the vast and incalculable sacrifices of the Soviet people and the other freedom-loving peoples in this war. The proposal of the Australian delegation, which is objecting to the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning reparations for the U.S.S.R., and is insistent on the transfer of this question to some commission or other for study, cannot be regarded otherwise than as an insult to justice, as disrespect for the memory of those who perished in this war.

The Soviet delegation insists that the proposal of the Australian delegation should be rejected, and that endorsement should be given to the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which gives minimum satisfaction to the requirements of justice—I repeat: gives minimum satisfaction to the requirements of justice.

One more observation. The Australian delegation proposes that the decision on the question of reparations should be postponed for six months, and passed on to some commission or other. But how are we to act if differences arise in this commission? Who will settle them? Evidently we shall have once again to call a new peace conference? But this only means that the proposal of the Australian delegation amounts in substance to the postponement of the conference for six months, and consequently to the postponement of the signature of the peace treaties.

There is yet another question which touches upon the legal side of the affair. The Australian delegation proposes that the total sum of reparations which Italy will have to pay to France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Ethiopia and other States which suffered Italian aggression should be determined within six months after the signature of the peace treaties. This means that the peace treaties are to be signed without indicating in them the sum of reparations payments on the part of Italy. This means that a "blanket clause" is to be left in the peace treaties—a blank space, without indicating any sum of reparations payments, the latter having to be determined within six months of the signature of the treaties. But such a proposal from the legal point of view is nonsensical and absurd. One must have a very low estimation of the mental qualities of the Italian Government to imagine that it will accept such a trick as the signature of a treaty containing an article in which no fixed sum is mentioned! Such is the ab-

surdity reached by the Australian delegation, blinded by its harmful political prejudices!

Why does the Soviet delegation insist so much on the proper settlement of the question of reparations? Because it considers that this is the fundamental and key question of the Peace Treaty. It must be known that without reparations there is not, and cannot be, any Peace Treaty. A peace treaty which does not provide for reparations can satisfy nobody: it will be an unjust treaty, which does not answer the requirements of legitimate retribution.

I address myself to the members of the Committee in the profound confidence that, following the principles of justice, they will reject the proposal of the Australian delegation and will agree with the solution proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

As for the Soviet Union, it requires no commission, and there is nothing for a commission to do in this sphere. The damage inflicted upon the Soviet State by the Italian Fascist bands is clear, the sum partially making good this damage has been fixed, the source of reparations has been determined. The government of Italy itself—a country which has been vanquished and has bowed its head before the will of the victors—does not raise objections, either against the sum of reparations laid down by the Council of Foreign Ministers or against the sources indicated whence these reparations can be drawn. It has agreed to submit to the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Yet here people have come forward to intervene from outside, and to exert every effort to thwart this decision and hinder the cause of the establishment of a just peace. I insist on the rejection of the Australian amendment in its entirety, as unjust and antagonistic to the interests of the Soviet Union and of other countries which experienced the horrors of invasion by enemy hordes.

VI
REPARATIONS FROM ITALY
Two Speeches at the Committee on Economic
Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with
Italy, August 30, 1946

1.

Manoeuvre of Canadian Delegation Exposed

THE Soviet delegation has more than once had to place on record that, whenever it is a question of the direct interests of the Soviet people and the Soviet Union, obstacles of some kind or another immediately rise up in the way of those interests. In order to create those obstacles and prevent the Soviet Union receiving just satisfaction of its demands, the Australian delegation exerted no little effort in this Committee, as its members will recall. These efforts, to our satisfaction, suffered a fiasco and ended in what I will call disgraceful defeat. But the laurels of the defeated delegation of one country give no rest, apparently, to the representatives of another country. Today we have to record a new attempt to thwart the successful work of our Committee. Therefore I cannot leave unanswered the speech by Mr. Wilgress—a speech all the more significant because he is the Ambassador of Canada in the Soviet Union, who, it would seem, could have understood better and more profoundly than other foreigners the importance of the reparations question for the Soviet Union. Mr. Wilgress spent all the years of the war in the Soviet Union, he has seen and knows our country, he was a witness of military operations in the territory of the U.S.S.R. And after all this the Canadian representative takes the floor here to thwart the just decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which in its substance no one questions. What is the purpose of the speech of the Canadian delegate, what objectives does he set before himself? He is proposing that today we should not endorse Article 1, and consequently should not endorse the sum of reparations proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Why, in virtue of what considerations? These considerations have been very clearly set forth by the Canadian delegate. They reduce themselves to this, that the sum of 100 million dollars should be brought into keeping, as he said, with the demands of other countries. We have heard of these demands. We recall that they run into hundreds of millions of dollars. Egypt is demanding more than 500 million dollars. Greece 2 milliard dollars

and more, Ethiopia 775 million dollars, and so on. Are we to understand that the proposal of Mr. Wilgress is to bring the sum of reparations required by the Soviet Union into keeping with these demands? Is Mr. Wilgress perchance dissatisfied with 100 million dollars for the Soviet Union, as an extremely low sum, and does he intend to propose a higher sum to make good the losses suffered by the Soviet Union, and thereby bring the sum into keeping with the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by the Italian invasion? Nothing of the kind. There is simply an attempt here, under the cover of every kind of formal and legalistic casuistry, to try and postpone as long as possible the satisfaction of the just demands of the Soviet Union. The speech of the Canadian representative is a manoeuvre intended to prevent a decision on reparations for the Soviet Union. We must expose this manoeuvre. The Soviet delegation considers that it would be unseemly—I repeat, unseemly—and indecent to take the path along which the Canadian delegation is now dragging us. I am sure the Committee will not take that path, and will not oblige us to return again and again to facts which cry to the high heavens. Of course I know that not all are born to see the heavens.

2.

(i) Hypocritical words of the Canadian Delegation

I don't know whether I should thank Mr. Wilgress for the support he is giving to the Soviet Union or whether, on the contrary, I should continue to express my amazement at the peculiar nature of that support. What Mr. Wilgress has said has confirmed what I saw in his speech at the beginning of the meeting, and has not in any way shaken the observations and conclusions which I made on the subject of his speech. In reality Mr. Wilgress, according to his statement, sympathises with the Soviet Union. If you please, he really was in the Soviet Union during the war, he did see the destruction inflicted upon the Soviet Union by the enemy, and he even admires—yes, he actually admires—the way in which the Soviet Union is restoring its economy and healing its wounds. But at the same time he continues to insist that the settlement of the question of the exact sum of reparations for the U.S.S.R. should be postponed—although the U.S.S.R. is a country which has gone through a number of severe trials, and the sum has been fixed as a result of difficult and determined work in the Council of Foreign Ministers, as the representatives of Great Britain, the United States and France rightly remarked. Mr. Wilgress is in no way satisfied by this. He insists that the settlement of this question should be postponed. He invents, as a motive for such postponement, the argument that the sum of 100 millions needs to be brought into keeping, forsooth, with those reparations amounts which will be laid down for other countries. But in what way is it to be brought into keeping? What pre-

cisely does Mr. Wilgress propose to bring into keeping? I will put a direct question to Mr. Wilgress, and let him answer it without hiding behind far-reaching and entirely irresponsible words and general phrases: is he questioning the sum of 100 million dollars in the sense of its increasing or its diminution, or does he think it necessary to object because he has not fully grasped the question? In the latter event one can only express the wish that the Canadian representative should master the issue involved as rapidly as possible. But this cannot serve as a justification for delaying a settlement of this question. The fact that the Canadian delegation does not want to meet the Soviet Union on the question of this insignificant sum is obvious, if only from the fact that Mr. Wilgress brings forward a second argument against this clause. It now turns out that he is doubtful, do you see, not only on the first but also on the third clause, and therefore thinks them unacceptable, and says that it is difficult to adopt them until he has received the necessary information. But what information is it still necessary to receive on the third clause? What does the third clause say? It says that, within the limits of the sum of 100 million dollars, the Soviet Union and the Italian Government will have to conclude an agreement about commodity deliveries i.e., an agreement such as the U.S.S.R. two years ago already concluded with Rumania, Hungary and Finland, an agreement which has fully justified itself, and which will say that Italy undertakes to deliver such and such commodities. This is not enough for Mr. Wilgress. He is proposing that a settlement of the question of the 100 million dollars should be postponed until the committee registering the claims of other countries has completed its work. But that committee has not yet begun its work, and no one knows the date when it will finish that work. Moreover there is no connection whatever between the first and second questions. It is thus clear that this is an artificial argument, invented with a special purpose of thwarting a decision that 100 million dollars should go to the Soviet Union. Then say so in so many words—that in words you favour reparations for the U.S.S.R., but that when it comes to a practical decision you want to prevent it. Your proposal to postpone a decision about the 100 million dollars, without indicating the date, is nothing more than a proposal to postpone to the Greek Kalends, which as you know the Greeks never had, and which consequently means postponing it to all eternity! That is how matters stand in reality.

(ii) Justice of the Soviet Union's Proposal

Well, but how does Italy look at this question? We have on this subject the Note of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs of November 5, 1945. In this Note the Italian Government expresses the view that the most it could expect would be that each of the United Nations should draw up a list of its claims and describe

to the Italian Government the losses it has suffered, and that the Italian Government, concluding the necessary bilateral agreements concerning the sum of losses, could come to the best possible agreement with each of the United Nations as to the reparation for losses the latter has suffered. What means of making good its debt to the United Nations which have suffered aggression does the Italian Government see? This can be judged from the Italian official document of November 5, 1945, which I have mentioned. It is by means of bilateral agreements: agreements between victors and vanquished, between those who suffered losses and those who caused them. This is what is mentioned in clause 3 of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy. We think this the best means of solving the problem. The Italian Government think so too. But Mr. Wilgress and the representative of Australia inciting him — although I don't know which is inciting which—are objecting to this means, without however proposing anything in its place. For the Soviet delegation their plans and their intentions are clear: having failed in one undertaking, they are trying to get their revenge in another, and in any case to prevent a decision. They say that Italy will not be in a position to pay reparations. If that is the case, then say so frankly. If that is the situation, then don't vote for reparations, vote against them. But the talk about the impossibility for Italy of paying 100 million dollars as reparations to the Soviet Union has no foundation. How do matters stand in reality. The Italian Government has approached the Soviet Government in Moscow with a proposal to restore trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy. The Italian Government points out in its Note that a considerable section of Italian industry and shipyards are at present in good working condition, while as for undertakings which have been more or less damaged, they are being restored and will be able to resume work. It would not be difficult for Italian industry, says the Note, to undertake even considerable deliveries in the sphere of shipbuilding, manufacture of diesel engines, motors, electrical equipment, precision tools and optical apparatus, electrical traction machinery, machine-tools of various kinds, road-building machinery and so forth. That is the present state of Italian economy, although naturally it did suffer during the war. Italy says to us: we want to restore and reinforce our trade connections, and we are in a position to do so, we can do so and so for you, our economy is in a position to do it. We want to meet them on this question. And therefore, instead of the foreign currency which the Australians want to thrust upon us, we say: current production—because we want the factories and works of Italy which manufacture these goods to start working. This will help in the restoration of Italian industry, it will give work to tens of thousands, and even more, of Italian workmen, and so forth. Part of this output would be delivered by Italy under the heading of reparations. That is what the Soviet

Union proposes should be done. The proposal of the Soviet Union for settling the question of Italian reparations in favour of the U.S.S.R. is a just proposal, and is distinguished by this indubitable advantage, that it does not undermine, but on the contrary reinforces the national economy of Italy.

Mr. Wilgress sees the third clause of the draft, and for some reason does not notice the fourth clause, which says that the Soviet Union takes upon itself the obligation to supply Italy with the raw materials required for the manufacture of this or that variety of product, in those cases in which such raw materials were usually imported by Italy from other countries.

The Australian and Canadian delegations treat the question of reparations from Italy in favour of the U.S.S.R. as an affair alien to them—and that is understandable. As you know, there were no Italian Fascist troops either in the territory of Australia or in the territory of Canada. That was the good fortune of Australia and Canada. But you fortunate ones have not the right to take up such an attitude as you now take up in relation to those who, to their misfortune, saw the invaders on their territory and suffered loss from enemy occupation. It seems to me that the arguments which we have been hearing in this committee to-day, and not for the first time either, have their whole point turned in one direction—that of thwarting the decisions adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers and supported by all the countries which have suffered from enemy occupation.

The Soviet Union is claiming reparations not only for itself but also for all countries which have suffered from war or occupation. We have already said that we are asking for a minimum part of reparations in compensation of our own losses. The U.S.S.R. has said that it understands and supports other countries in their demands, if they ask for more, because they are weaker than the Soviet Union and it is more difficult for them to cope with the restoration of their economy, it is more difficult for them to make good the damage inflicted. We have agreed to less. But now there appear pleaders who, defending the abstract idea of justice, in fact are making every effort to prevent that lesser amount being given at all. And this is called sympathy and support. I don't know whether we ought to thank them for such "support" and such "friendship", or frankly say: "God preserve us from such friends, and we shall somehow deal with the enemy ourselves"

VII

REPARATIONS FROM ITALY AND THE AUSTRALIAN AMENDMENT

Speech at the Meeting of the Committee on Economic Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy on September 2, 1946, when the Australian Delegation proposed that the amount and kind of goods to be supplied as reparations to the Soviet Union should be the subject of agreement not between the Italian Government and the Soviet Government, as proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, but between the Soviet Government and a reparations committee.

(This proposal was rejected by 13 votes to 7)

I MUST say something about the Australian amendment to the third paragraph of Article 64 of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy. This paragraph says that the amount and kind of goods to be delivered as reparations should form the subject of agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Italy, and that these goods are to be selected and deliveries are to be scheduled in such a manner as not to hinder the economic reconstruction of Italy and not to create additional obligations for the Allied and United Powers. The Australian amendment, set forth very briefly by the Australian delegate, proposes to replace the words that the agreement should be concluded between the Soviet Government and Italy by the words that the agreement is to be concluded between the Soviet Government and a reparations committee.

I cannot conceal my surprise at this proposal. I have turned several times to the text of the amendment and recalled what the Australian delegate said here, believing that there was some misunderstanding. I am still under this impression, and I expect the Australian delegate to come out and say that this is a misunderstanding, that this amendment is meaningless in its essence, and that it distorts the whole system of relations that have been formed in the field of reparations and that should be established between the vanquished and victor countries.

Up to now, arrangements for the payment of reparations have throughout history been based on the only possible foundation: the victor has advanced demands and the vanquished has fulfilled these demands; the victor has presented his claims, placing certain obligations upon the vanquished, while the vanquished has assumed the obligations to discharge them, and assumed responsibility for discharging them.

No other relations can exist in this matter between victor and vanquished. This fact lies at the basis of the legal relationship between a victor State and a vanquished State, and forms the subject of agreement between two parties. There are two parties—the claimant and the defendant, the victor and the vanquished—and it is their function to conclude agreements concerning obligations which one party assumes towards the other party. Whether there is one claimant or several claimants is an altogether different matter which presents no problem to the legal expert. This is a problem for a freshman just starting to study law.

Let us take the Versailles Treaty as an example. The Soviet Union did not take part in drafting or signing the Versailles Treaty, and bears no responsibility for it. In this case, however, I turn to the factual material contained in that Treaty. The Versailles Treaty provided for the organisation of a reparations committee. As you will remember, several Articles of the Versailles Treaty—Articles 231, 232, etc.—deal with this subject. Let us turn to these documents in order to draw upon the past, that is upon history, to assist us in assessing the present and justifying our future. You will see that at that time, after the First World War, the Reparations Committee consisted of representatives of the victor countries. It was before this committee representing the victor countries that Germany, as a vanquished country, bore responsibility for discharging reparations obligations.

Appendix 4 to the Versailles Treaty lists Germany's specific obligations. In the sixth paragraph you can read a list of specific goods which Germany was to supply to the victor countries as advance payment. It says, in particular, that within three months after the Treaty came into force, Germany was obliged to deliver a certain number of live cattle; to the French Government, 5,000 stud horses, 300,000 cows of Ardennes, Boulogne and Belgian breeds; 2,000 bulls, 90,000 milch cows, 100,000 sheep, etc. The Belgian Government was to receive fewer stud horses, fewer cows, fewer sheep and goats. But everything that was to be delivered on account of reparations was quite definitely specified. Deliveries of coal were specified in millions of tons in Appendix 5, deliveries of dyestuffs in Appendix 6. It only remained for the Reparations Committee to supervise the discharge of the specific obligations towards the victor countries which Germany as a vanquished country assumed under the Treaty.

Thus it happened in history after the First World War. I should mention that the Reparations Committee had no functions but to supervise the discharge by Germany of her reparations obligations, and certainly the victor countries did not and could not conclude any agreements with the Reparations Committee, since that would have been nonsensical. Yet this is the very nonsense the Australian delegation has dared to suggest to the Conference.

How do matters stand now? We already have experience, and

quite substantial experience at that. Let us take examples in the field of reparations relationships between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Rumania, Hungary and Finland on the other. Agreements on goods deliveries have been concluded between the Soviet Union and Rumania, between the Soviet Union and Hungary, between the Soviet Union and Finland. And mutual understanding was reached as to the kind and quantities of goods, as to the prices at which these goods are to be supplied, and as to the terms and procedure for deliveries. Under these agreements Rumania, Hungary and Finland assumed definite obligations. They must discharge them, and I must say they are discharging them conscientiously. Such is the basis of the legal relationship between the Soviet Union as the victor and Rumania, Hungary and Finland as the vanquished countries.

I must excuse myself for speaking in such detail on this subject, but I am bound to do so, because the Australian proposal turns everything upside down and puts everything bottom-up. Instead of making use of experience already available in matters of reparations, instead of taking the path that has already been cleared and explored, the Australian delegation invents totally unreal plans and proposals—harmful plans and proposals. They propose an amendment to the Treaty under which agreements should be concluded between the Soviet Union and a reparations committee. In other words, responsibility for reparations deliveries will not be borne by Italy and the Italian Government, as it should and indeed must be, but by a reparations committee. The Soviet Union would have to present its claims to a reparations committee instead of to Italy, the Soviet Union would receive payments from a reparations committee and not from Italy and the Italian Government. Is it possible? I ask once more—is it possible?

A reparations committee cannot be a substitute for the Italian Government. The Italian Government cannot disclaim responsibility by shifting it to a reparations committee. If we assume that a reparations committee will be set up—and this is a question with which I shall try to deal specially, to explain the Soviet attitude—in any case its functions cannot include the tasks which the Australian delegation is trying to impose upon it. It is not a reparations committee, but Italy that will answer before the victors who demand and obtain reparations.

The formula proposed by the Australian delegation leaves no room for the Italian Government—the Italian Government has disappeared from the field of vision. The authors of the amendment put the Soviet Union on one side and a reparations committee on the other side. In order to demonstrate how meaningless and nonsensical this amendment is, one should bear in mind who is to compose the reparations committee, according to this proposal. The Australian delegate proposes that the reparations committee should consist of representatives of the four Great

Powers as well as the three other Powers concerned. What do we see? We see that the States which obtain reparations are to conclude agreements on goods deliveries with the reparations committee, which means with their own representatives. In the given case, which concerns the Soviet Union, arrangements according to the Australian proposal would be such that the Soviet Union would have to conclude an agreement on reparations deliveries with a committee of which the U.S.S.R. representative would be a member. And where is the Italian Government? Where are Italy's obligations? Where is Italy's responsibility? Suffice it to put those questions, to which the Australian proposal supplies no answer, to see that this proposal is devoid of any meaning, that this is a harmful proposal.

I move that this proposal tabled by the Australian delegation be rejected, and that we accept the proposal set forth in the draft prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

VIII
THE PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(Reply to Signor Bonomi)

**Speech at the Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy,
September 5, 1946**

(i) Falsification of History

WE have listened attentively to the declaration of the Italian Government's representative. He did not confine himself to stating his own viewpoint and that of his Government concerning the question of the frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy, but broadened the limits of his discourse and delved deep into history. In this respect he journeyed as far as the times of ancient Rome, to use his own words. He did this in order to convince the Committee, to convince all of us, that the Julian March, as he asserted without sparing words, had for centuries been regarded by the Italian people as an inalienable part of Italian territory. To confirm this contention, Signor Bonomi cited a number of outstanding Italians, including the great Dante, whose name he mentioned among those who regarded the Julian March as Italian land and whose penetrating vision even then evidently foresaw the agreement of 1915 and the Rapallo Treaty of 1920. It would not be difficult to prove, however, that all this talk is very artificial, and essentially would not have merited attention were it not calculated for some kind of verbal effect.

I have no doubt that the contentions which the Italian Government's representative tried to defend here will not be accepted by the Committee, which will not let itself be carried away by the logic of the representatives of the Italian Government, if only for the reason that this logic is groundless and has no foundation in real historical facts. Facts were lacking in the statement of the Italian representative. He replaced facts by phrases and abstract declarations, in sharp contradiction with reality.

Signor Bonomi did not stop at any straightforward distortion of the events which he mentioned, in particular of those associated with the First World War, which passed before the eyes of many of us, at any rate, of many of those now taking part in the work of the Paris Peace Conference and which are still fresh in our memory. Therefore, one cannot overlook this deliberate distortion, this pseudo-history expounded here by the Italian representative. In his declaration which we heard here on September 2,

Signor Bonomi, referring for instance to the military events of 1915—in the First World War—spoke as if to the Italian troops belonged the credit for the defeat of the Habsburg Monarchy, the liberation of the Slav peoples from the Austrian yoke and the formation of the Serb State.

Signor Bonomi declared outright that the liberation of Serbia and the granting of an opportunity to the Slovenes and Croats to unite in a new state was one of Italy's war aims. Signor Bonomi went so far as to glorify here the Rapallo Treaty of 1920 which, as is well known, plundered Yugoslavia—the Serb-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom of that time. It should be added that in this disgraceful act—in this greatest historical injustice done to the Slav peoples—an active part was taken by Signor Bonomi himself, who was then War Minister, together with Prime Minister Giolitti and Foreign Minister Count Sforza.

Under this Treaty, as is well known, the Serb-Croat-Slovenian State was deprived of Istria, Zara, the Dalmation coast, Cherso, Lussin, Lagosta, the Pelagoza Islands, small islets and even rocks in favour of Italy.

Had we more time, it would undoubtedly be of considerable interest to dwell in greater detail upon an analysis of the Rapallo Treaty, just as it would not be without interest to dwell on the Treaty of 1924, which was signed by Mussolini himself and was devoted to the so-called economic development of Fiume, used as a cover for Italy's annexationist policy.

I return to 1915. I would like to ask: is it possible that the Italian representative counted on the impunity of his uncereemonious treatment of facts when in his declaration he described the events of 1915—facts which are well known and precisely established? What do these facts say? These facts say something quite different from what was said here by Signor Bonomi. These facts say that the Habsburg Monarchy fell and the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved as a result of such events as the offensive of the Russian troops on Lvov in September, 1914, the rout and retreat of two Austro-German armies, the seizure of Przemyśl by the Russian troops in February, 1916, with all the grave consequences for Austria ensuing from this; finally, these facts speak about an event known in history as Brusilov's breakthrough to the Carpathians in the summer of 1916, which ended in smashing the entire Austro-German front and the capture of hundreds of thousands of Austrian officers and men.

Here are the facts which say how matters stood in 1915 in reality. Here are the facts which show wherein lay the reasons for the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the reasons for the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These facts first of all consist in the remarkable military successes of the Russian Army, successes associated with the name of one of the outstanding Russian strategists of that time, Gen. Brusilov.

Signor Bonomi, with striking nonchalance, declared here that

it was the Italian troops which liberated the Slav peoples from German imperialism, that it was just the Italian troops—who incidentally were only saved as a result of the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian troops by Brussilov. This defeat of the Austrian armies thwarted the assault of Verdun and opened wide the prospects for a national liberation movement of the Slav peoples in Austria. These facts cannot be overlooked. Yet the Italian representative credits the liberation of the Slav peoples and the formation of the Slav State to the successes of Italian arms. I do not want to take up too much time, but I do feel it necessary to say a few words in defence of historical truth, for we cannot tolerate distortions of history by false contentions in defence of false annexationist tendencies. These facts are sufficient to restore historical truth and show the true aspect of events, so different from the contentions of the Italian representative. He followed, evidently, the regrettable tradition of Italian politicians of the type of Giovanni Gentile and similar Fascist scribes, who presented Italian militarists like Gen. De Bono, Graziani, Messe and others in the likeness of ancient Roman heroes and triumphvires.

(ii) The First World War and Italy

Without any compunction Signor Bonomi declared here in the Luxembourg Palace that Italy's aim in the First World War was to overthrow German imperialism—I am quoting him verbatim—and simultaneously to liberate the Julian March.

Signor Bonomi represented Italian imperialism in the war of 1914-18 as the liberator of the Slav peoples.

But how was it in reality? What were the motives of Italy's entry into the First World War on the side of the Entente? What aspirations and ideals guided Italian policy when Italy entered the war, and how did she enter that war? Let us recall these facts, too. It is well known that prior to May, 1915, Italy belonged to the Triple Alliance, to the triumvirate of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. Thus, she was in alliance both with German imperialism and with Austro-Hungarian imperialism, which dragged after the chariot of German Entente, choosing a convenient moment to join the most likely winner without any risk to herself. In the First World War Italy succeeded in this. It is well known, however, that in the Second World War Italy totally failed in this. Success does not always attend a jackal policy. So in April, 1915, Italy struck a bargain with the Entente Powers, which promised to pay more than Austro-Hungary could pay. It is well known that on April 26, 1915, Italy concluded a secret agreement with the States of the Entente, and that under this agreement Italy was promised Valona and the Saseno Island (which is the subject of special article 22 in the draft Peace Treaty for Italy, drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers in con-

formity with which Italy renounces all claims to this island), and Italy gave her consent to the partition of Albania.

Incidentally, Italy agreed to this partition under the condition that her right to represent Albania in all foreign relations would be recognised. This fact, sufficiently clear in itself, testifies to the real motives of Italy's participation in the First World War on the side of the Entente. It was just for this price—Istria, the Dalmatian coast and a British loan of 50 million pounds sterling—that Italy agreed to come out against Germany, agreed, to cite Signor Bonomi, to fight German imperialism.

One cannot deny a certain shrewdness to the Italian politicians. They chose their time well. Italy pledged herself to come out against her allies Germany and Austria, hoping to receive in return the lands of the so-called Italia irridenta and having received no small amount of base metal. I do not think that anything could be found about this in Dante, to whom Signor Bonomi referred. But undoubtedly something fitting could be found in D'Annunzio, well known for his delirious Fascist "ideas." I would recommend Signor Bonomi to turn for inspiration to D'Annunzio rather than to Dante.

Such are the facts. These facts can be summarised and the following characterisation given of the Italy of 1915:

"Revolutionary-democratic Italy, that is, revolutionary-bourgeois Italy, the Italy that cast off the yoke of Austria, the Italy of Garibaldi's time, decisively changes before our very eyes into an Italy oppressing other peoples, robbing Turkey and Austria, an Italy of a crude repulsively reactionary and rapacious bourgeoisie whose mouth waters in the expectation of a share in the plunder to which it is admitted."

Here are words full of deep sarcasm and deep historical truth. These words belong to the great builder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Lenin.

Such are the facts.

(iii) Julian March

Now I will pass to the next question, that of the Julian March.

What is the Julian March? The national composition of the Julian March is really very heterogenous. This is confirmed by the Austrian 1910 census and by the census of 1945, which was more correct and corresponded more to reality. But in spite of the heterogeneity of the ethnical composition of this region, the bulk of the population consists of Southern Slavs—Slovenes and Croats—who in a solid mass occupy the entire territory, nearly nine-tenths of this region.

It has been established beyond dispute that this Slav sea contains small islands of Italian population which do not form a single whole, either economically or ethnically, and that the Italians—this is also a fact—reside mostly and even exclusively

in the towns of Trieste, Gorizia, Fiume, Pola, and also along the lower stream of the Isonzo River (Gradisca, Monfalcone) in the area of the western coast of Istria (Capo d'Istria, Pirano, Parenzo, Ravignone), also in the north-western part of the peninsula (Buie, Montana, Pinguente, Pisino). These facts are not disputed by anyone, but they do not decide anything. They are facts which can be taken into consideration, which must be reckoned with, but which do not decide anything. The decisive fact is that the Julian March from the point of view of ethnographical character is a Slovenian region, a Slovenian land.

According to the 1910 census, 480,000 Slovenes resided in the territory which subsequently entered into the composition of the Italian region of Venezia Giulia. According to Yugoslav sources, their number has increased to 600,000 or 650,000. If we consider that the total population of this area consists of one million persons, then we shall see that the Slavs account for nearly two-thirds of the population of the entire Julian March. According to the Austrian 1910 census, which obviously under-estimates the number of Slavs residing in the Julian March, the Italian population consisted of not more than 330,000 persons. Consequently the Slav population of the Julian March greatly exceeds the Italian population. This is due to the fact that the Julian March, with its well-known historical past, is Yugoslav territory to the same extent as other parts of Yugoslavia adjacent to it.

At the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the autumn of 1945, the head of the Soviet delegation at the present Conference, V. M. Molotov, made the following statement regarding this question:

"What would the transfer of Istria into Italy's hands mean? To speak frankly, it would mean the seizure of other people's territory. Why is it necessary to seize other people's territory? In order to develop its policy of a movement to the east. It is well known from history that this was for many years the policy of Germany and also of Italy. We know perfectly well that at a certain historical period the idea of seizing Slav territories possessed the rulers of Germany. This policy of 'Drang nach Osten'—a movement to the east at the expense of the Slavs—reached its culmination in the policy of Hitlerite Germany, which wanted to seize the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and so on. In Italy, this policy also has historic roots. Its development found expression in the annexationist plans which were carried out by Mussolini—true, not only at the expense of the Slavs but pre-eminently at their expense, at least in Europe."

This was said before the Paris Conference, before the speeches of Signor De Gasperi and Signor Bonomi in our Committee. One can easily see that the main trend of present Italian policy is in no way different from what had been noted in the characterisation given by V. M. Molotov. This is how matters stand regarding the Julian March.

(iv) Trieste and Yugoslavia

And how do matters stand regarding Trieste? What is Trieste? First of all we must draw attention to such a peculiar feature of Trieste as the fact that it is surrounded by boundless Slav fields. Trieste is the centre of the entire territory, its main directing nerve, its main lever. The fate of Trieste is organically bound with that of the whole region, of the whole territory.

The entire history of Trieste testifies that it breathes Slav air, that its life is filled with the Slav spirit. Having subjugated Istrian settlements, the Venetians many ages ago tried to subjugate Trieste. Four times in the course of the 13th and 14th centuries they seized Trieste. Trieste was weak, and the menace of Venice compelled Trieste in 1382 to accept the protection of an Austrian Duke. Since then, until 1918, except for a small interval from 1808 to 1816 when Trieste formed part of the "Illyrian Republic" created by Napoleon I, it belonged to Austria, being her most important Adriatic port. All that time Italy had nothing to do with Trieste. What were the ages mentioned by Signor Bonomi during which the Italian people and the "finest men" of Italy dreamed and fought for the incorporation of Istria into Italy? About what ages did he speak?

All ages tell something quite the opposite to what has been told here by Signor Bonomi. They say that Istria, including Trieste, in the course of the ages, never belonged to Italy.

On the eve of the First World War, Trieste was the biggest navigation and seaborne trade centre in the Central Mediterranean. The shipping companies of Trieste maintained regular lines to the ports of East Africa, Central America, the Near East and even to the Far East. Thus, Trieste became a most important seaport. At the same time it became an important industrial centre, with especially highly developed ship-building and oil-refining industries. One can say that for its port facilities and capacity, Trieste ranks with the best ports in Europe.

In 1918 Trieste was incorporated into Italy, and from that moment began its decline. Trieste decayed, while Venice within a quarter of a century—from 1913 to 1938—increased its turnover by 150 per cent. The freight turnover of Italian-held Trieste slumped. It is absolutely incomprehensible if we discount one motive—the desire to grab other people's land—why Italy should want so much to get Trieste when she has dozens of other ports, in particular in the Adriatic; but it is quite comprehensible to everyone why Yugoslavia wants this, since Trieste is the only port for her.

The fact that Trieste is a vital centre for Yugoslavia was realised by people capable of thinking objectively and independently.

In this connection, I could have referred to Lloyd George, who condemned the Rapallo Treaty. In his book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties" Lloyd George wrote that the war had completely upset the "conception of conscience when the Peace Con-

ference, in violation of the very principles in the name of which we had gone to war, allowed Italy to add to her possessions territories of which the vast majority of the population would have preferred to attach themselves to another sovereign State and where, if a plebiscite had been taken, it is beyond doubt that the vast majority would have cast their votes in favour of the Slavs and not of the Italians.”*

I could also have referred to the former Italian Prime Minister, Alfonso la Marmora, who could not be suspected of any lack of sympathy for military adventures, and who declared in 1886 before the Italian Senate:

“I never gave thought to the question of Trieste. This name never occurred to me. All the interests of this port, especially its trade, are connected with the North. The city itself is surrounded by a Slav population who do not want to have any relations with the Italians, save purely commercial ones. Had Trieste become for one reason or another Italian, it would have constituted a source of great trouble and endless dangers.” This is the voice of an Italian who could not be suspected of any sort of liberal ideas, but it is the voice of a man who, despite his political prejudices, found in himself the strength to be impartial to facts.

However, that happened in the year 1886. Allow me to refer to a later source. I have in view the book by Professor Toynbee, “Trieste and Italy,” written in 1915. This book sets forth clearly and firmly opinions which cannot be refused a hearing.

Professor Toynbee says that, in the period of struggle for independence, Italy inherited the influence of Venetia in the Adriatic. But this influence was not everywhere equally great. Thus, in Dalmatia the Italian element was absolutely insignificant as far as its influence was concerned and, therefore, Italy’s claims to this territory were out of the question. Thirty years ago, Prof. Toynbee contended that owing to the course of its economic development Trieste was already becoming a port of world importance, and that its population had swelled at the expense of the surrounding Slav population, with which the Italians had to divide the municipal administration. In view of all this, he said, Trieste should not have been included either in Italy or in Germany. It must enter, Prof. Toynbee continues, either into a united Southern Slav State or become an independent political unit guaranteed by Europe..

Prof. Toynbee, however, believed that the latter decision was undesirable, since such an insignificant state would have lacked sufficient means for administration and for the protection of its most important economic features. Neither could its fate be decided without reckoning with the will of the population. “It is evident,” he says, “that if a plebiscite had resulted in a decision

*Retranslated from the Russian text.

for incorporating Trieste into a South Slav State as a federal unit, this question could have been regarded as solved.”*

This is a clear statement in favour of the incorporation of Trieste in Yugoslavia. Correspondingly, this is a clear and unequivocal recognition of Yugoslavia's indisputable title to Trieste.

“A guarantee of independence,” Prof. Toynbee said further, “could hardly have prevented the absorption of Italian and German minorities by Italy and Germany, which would have been much worse for them than more or less independent co-operation with the Slav nationality. To preserve peace in Europe,” he continues, “it is necessary that national groups forcibly included into Austria should receive an independent national existence. Incidentally, they have an economic basis for this—raw materials of the south-east, manufactured goods from the north-west and the seaborne trade of the Adriatic coast, all of which complement each other.

“Besides, Trieste serves as an economic link between the Balkans and Central Europe. It is highly important for the prosperity of Central Europe that these economic ties of Trieste should remain intact. Slovenia must remain an open market, a meeting place for the Balkans and other European countries. On the other hand, there are no economic ties between Trieste and Italy because Italian economy, based on the water power of the Alps, tends to the Mediterranean (Genoa Port) and not to the Adriatic. This, perhaps, is one of the main arguments against giving Trieste to Italy,”* concludes Prof. Toynbee. Such is the opinion of an eminent British authority on Trieste and its destiny.

I have said enough to show how lightly the facts are treated by the representative of the Italian Government who made his declaration here.

The head of the Soviet delegation, V. M. Molotov, said that for Yugoslavia, Trieste is the main and even the sole port of national importance. To take Trieste from the Julian March means to deprive Yugoslavia of her sole big port and at the same time place Trieste itself in a position in which it would lack the basis for further development and growth.

This is why the Soviet delegation has reached the conclusion that there can be no doubt that the incorporation of Trieste in Yugoslavia would ensure favourable conditions for its development as a port and as a trading and industrial centre for a vast territory.

It is just this that is envisaged in the draft of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Istria and the formation of a free territory of Trieste. This decision does not satisfy certain other delegations and first of all—the Yugoslav delegation. But the decision proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers represents the minimum realisation of justice. It is well known that in

*Retranslated from the Russian.

politics one is bound sometimes to accept such a minimum, because politics is not arithmetic, where twice two is always four. This must be reckoned with. On the other hand, discontent with the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers is also expressed by some who hastily attempted here to divert the suspicion from themselves that they were advocates of Italian imperialism. The Brazilian delegation in particular, acted in this manner, although nobody mentioned them by name. This reminds me of the old proverb: "A guilty conscience is never at ease."

But I shall not dwell on these delegations and shall return to the Italian delegation. In his statement, Signor Bonomi referred to the report of the Committee of Experts for investigation of the problem of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, in particular to paragraph 76 of this report, dealing with the territorial distribution of the Italian, Croat and Slovene population of Istria. Unfortunately, following his method, Signor Bonomi referred only to the one part of the report which is to his advantage, namely to the part dealing with the distribution of the Italian population, and absolutely omitted to mention the Croat and Slovene population.

Meanwhile, paragraph 76 of the report of the Committee of Experts says the following: "The Croat and Slovene population resides mostly in rural localities which, in considerable number, are situated around towns inhabited by Italians. Besides, this population spreads towards the coast in three directions, namely, north of the Dragonia River, along both banks of the Leme Canal, and in the southern extremity of the peninsula south of Pola."

Leaving aside details, I will merely add that in 1910 Italians constituted the majority only in 16 out of 43 administrative communities of Istria, and according to 1945 statistics only in eight communities out of 43.

Consequently, one can arrive at the following conclusion, on the basis of the statistics of 1910-1945: the Italian population of Istria is concentrated in the form of separate islands in a narrow coastal band and mostly in certain towns. All the rest of the population, the overwhelming majority, two-thirds, is Slav; and this determines also the life of those towns where the Italian population predominates to a certain extent. Therefore, when Signor Bonomi repeats over and over again in Paris what the Italian delegate said nearly a year ago in London, and in London repeated what the Italian Prime Minister Orlando said nearly 30 years ago in Paris, it proves only how tenacious are the nationalistic annexationist tendencies and appetites of Italian ruling circles. Signor Bonomi again covets western and southern Istria, those ancient Slav lands, representing the greed of Italian aggressors as the voice of justice. Signor Bonomi opposes the formation of a free territory of Trieste. The frontier suggested by the Council of Foreign Ministers is unacceptable to him, he says, from the viewpoint of defence.

Signor Bonomi ventured to declare here that the frontier be-

tween Italy and Yugoslavia proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers was unacceptable to Italy from the point of view of her security, as it allegedly left Italy open to invasion and made it possible for an aggressor to encircle Italian territory in the direction of the sea.

What invasion does Signor Bonomi speak of? Of what aggressor threatening Italy do those reactionary Italian circles speak which even now do not conceal their aggressive desires? This kind of language is no more than an attempt to divert attention to the other side and to camouflage their own aggressive intentions with cries about the menace of aggression. Signor Bonomi said here that the formation of a free territory of Trieste would disturb the ethnical equilibrium. For the sake of the strengthening of this invented ethnical equilibrium, Signor Bonomi demands the inclusion of the western and southern part of Istria together with the port of Pola, into a free territory of Trieste.

Such are the solicitations of the present Italian Government, solicitations covered up by cries of justice. These solicitations must resolutely be rejected. We hope they will certainly be rejected.

We heard here the statement of the Yugoslav delegation. I must say that this statement could not but produce a great impression by the strength of the facts cited, therein, by the strength of its truth. The Soviet delegation is of opinion that the considerations of the Yugoslav Government cannot but command the Committee's attention, and that the proposals advanced by the Yugoslav delegation cannot but command careful study and be taken into account in the final solution of the question.

The Soviet delegation, as I have said, believes that the decision adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers represents the minimum of justice, and expresses the hope that this Conference will cope with its tasks in a worthy manner by establishing the Yugoslav-Italian frontier in conformity with the principle of respect for the rights and interests of the Slav peoples, who lawfully demand an end to crude violation of their interests and rights.

It is proposed to us that any decision on the Trieste problem be postponed for one year. This is a harmful and dangerous proposal, and it also must be turned down.

Signor Bonomi ended his speech with an appeal for justice. Yes, we must remember justice. The historical injustice committed 26 years ago must be rectified, justice must be restored. The draft of the Peace Treaty with Italy prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers follows this line—the line of rectifying the injustice of Rapallo. Justice must inspire us in our difficult work. But there are different conceptions of justice, and there is a difference between one justice and another. One cannot speak about justice while encroaching upon other people's lands. One cannot cover attempts to seize foreign territory by high-sounding

words about justice. We are against such so-called justice, as in reality it would represent a crying injustice.

Of a different opinion, evidently, is the South African delegate, who stated here that sacrifices must be made and blood shed to establish peace. We reject such an attitude at the Peace Conference. The Soviet delegation stands for a stable peace which must and can be built upon progressive democratic foundations and not on any other foundations which would balance between war and peace. We want a peace which will be based on the recognition and unqualified implementation of the principles of right and justice, meeting the true interests of the people and demanding respect and recognition of their sovereign rights. The affirmation of such a peace is a great and noble task, for the solution of which we must live, work and fight.

IX

THE FRONTIERS OF THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE

**Speech at the Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy,
September 19, 1946**

THE discussion of Paragraph 1 of Article 16 (dealing with the frontiers of the Free Territory of Trieste) of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy took place in a businesslike atmosphere. A whole number of delegations have made declarations; it seems that half the members of the Political and Territorial Committee for Italy have stated their viewpoints and their considerations, and have thus made their contribution to the common effort being made here to find a just and agreed decision of these really difficult problems.

The task we are called upon to solve here can be called historic, because we stand on the eve of the birth of a new State formation within the boundaries of which peoples of not one but several nationalities must peacefully co-exist, co-operate and fight for their future. It is the task of the Conference to ease the constructive work of the people of Trieste. In the future Free Territory there must live and work free citizens—brothers—who must aim at one goal: in peaceful and comradely work, in great and responsible labour, not only to lay a foundation for their fraternal and brotherly co-operation, but also to build up the high walls of the new city. A new city, a new state will be built. We should wish this to be a state friendship of the peoples, of which the famous Italian philosopher and political leader Tomasso Campanella dreamed in his book "City of the Sun."

The considerations aired in this committee by various delegations were diverse and rich in content. The delegation of the U.S.S.R. must emphasise that it has listened to these remarks with deep attention, and believes they must be taken into account in solving the problem of the boundary of the Free Territory of Trieste, if we are not merely to pay lip service to our task, to solve which the Foreign Ministers' Council exerted such great effort, but actually to strive to accomplish it.

The viewpoints defended by the various delegations are often contradictory. But, as we know, truth is born of just such a clash of opinions. Our task, the task of people who have spent no small efforts to solve the problem of Trieste under different conditions and arrived at agreed decisions—I have in mind the delegations of the four Great Powers—is attentively to listen to everything

that is said here, and not to shake the adopted decision, but to check its correctness, and to see whether or not it needs any agreed changes or corrections. This is why we must analyse the declarations which have been made here.

(i) Defenders of the Unjust Cause

I believe I will be permitted to dwell on certain considerations which have been expounded here, especially on those the Soviet delegation feels to be erroneous. In the first place, I must dwell upon the South African delegate's pronouncement.

The South African delegate tried to prove that the districts adjoining Trieste were not Slav lands. True, his argument added nothing to what had already been said by certain delegates who opposed the Yugoslav plan and the so-called Byelorussian amendment. He defended the line once defended by the British delegation, but which has now been abandoned by its former advocates, since the British delegation now defends, not the line it originally submitted, and which might be called the British line, but a different line, referred to here as the French line.

I will not speak of the unenviable lot of people who undertake to defend a position abandoned by its chief defenders; the history, not only of wars, but also of peace conferences, teaches us that to maintain such a position is very difficult—nay, impossible.

We can record the fact that several lines were presented at the Foreign Ministers' Council, including the American and British lines which, however, were abandoned by the delegations that had suggested them. But in the rearguard there goes one more delegation—the delegation of the Union of South Africa—which stubbornly clings to past stages of our work and attempts to revive what is already dead. This has so far had no success, and the Soviet delegation believes that on this occasion, too, it will have no success, for reasons which I will set forth later.

Mr. Jordan has overlooked the circumstances that the representative of the British delegation, Mr. McNeil, called the French line just, disagreeing with my estimate of it as only a minimum of justice. Of course, the conception of justice is relative, but in any case we can record the fact that Mr. McNeil prefers the French line to the original British line. Therefore one should not refer now to the previously expressed opinion of the British experts, as the South African representative has done. These experts have now renounced their former position, since two opposing lines cannot be called equally just. The British delegation now believes that it is the French, and not the British, line that is just. Naturally, Mr. Jordan is free to defend the British line, believing it to be just, but he can no longer refer to the British experts and the British delegation, which have already renounced their support of this line. This is already a passed stage. It is vain for the South African delegation to try to drag us back to it.

But how do matters stand, essentially? Was Mr. Jordan really

right when he stated here, on behalf of the South African delegation, that 75 per cent. of the district surrounding the free territory of Trieste, as planned by the Foreign Ministers' Council, was Italian? This contention is refuted by facts. Suffice it to recall that on September 10 the Italian delegation circulated here its own map, on which part of the territory of Istria, which in conformity with the decision of the Foreign Ministers' Council should go to Yugoslavia, is tinted yellow; it is evident from this map that in this territory, if the French line is accepted, there will be 377,000 Slavs according to the statistics of the 1910 census, or 302,000 according to the 1921 census, with a relatively small number of Italians concentrated in the coastal towns. Can such a territory be called Italian, as is done by the South African delegate? Obviously not. However, the South African delegate proposes that a considerable part of that territory be handed over to Italy.

Thus the contention of the South African representative is refuted even by Italian statistics. I shall not even mention that the 1945 census affords an even more convincing ethnical characterisation, refuting this unjustified contention. According to this census there is an Italian majority in only eight communities out of 43, and not in 16, as indicated by the statistics of the 1910 census. The 1945 census established that 27 communities had a population consisting of 157,000 Croats and Slovenes, and 10,500 Italians. Does this furnish sufficient grounds to refute the contention of the Yugoslav delegation that this is Slav territory? Has anyone here cited data which to any degree reduces the value of the 1945 census? Has anyone proved that these statistics are wrong? Has anyone proved to us that the censuses of 1910 and 1921 carried more weight, were better grounded? No one has proved this. They say only that the 1910 census, carried out under conditions different from those which characterised the administrative methods of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, is wrong. This is an absolutely groundless statement, and it cannot be taken seriously.

(ii) The Rapallo Treaty and Istria

The South African delegation believes it to be a juridical fact that the Julian March belonged to Italy for 25 years. I beg the pardon of the South African representative, but it seems to me that he confuses two conceptions—legal ownership, and actual ownership which has no justification in law, no legal foundation. How should one regard the fact that Italy possessed the Julian March for 25 years, taking just principles of foreign policy as our viewpoint? Italy received the Julian March as a result of the London Agreement of 1915, and the Rapallo Treaty of 1920. But who will raise his voice here to defend these two acts, which the Soviet delegation, together with a number of other delegations, characterises as unjust?

We openly characterise the Rapallo Treaty as a predatory, un-

just treaty. This Treaty was the result of a game of political interests, and cannot in any circumstances be recognised as the expression of a just policy. Has anyone challenged this contention here? Who, among the advocates of the attitude taken by the South African delegation, is ready to prove, or has tried to prove that the Rapallo Treaty was just, and that it deserves the respect and recognition of history? No one could have said or has said this, because it cannot be said without an obvious contradiction of those juridical facts which were mentioned by Mr. Jordan. Rapallo is the synonym for a type of injustice that can often be met in history. As a result of this treaty, the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom was plundered in violation of the principles to which reference has here been made.

The South African delegation attempted to justify the annexation of the Julian March to Italy, asserting that Italy had a legitimate title to this territory. The U.S.S.R. delegation believes this contention to be wrong. It is unjust to demand the annexation to Italy of a slice of the Yugoslav littoral, 120 kilometres long and 6 to 24 kilometres wide, ignoring geographical, ethnical, economic and political considerations.

One cannot take seriously the remarks made here, that the Yugoslavs can always get a piece of land to take a rest on the seashore. This is not a serious statement. The point lies not in receiving the right to rest on other people's land, but in tasting the full sweetness of rest on one's own land.

This is why, when a corridor is built and the owner of the house is left outside behind the threshold of his own home, being granted the opportunity to relish the view of his native land from other people's windows, we refuse to agree with an attempt to present it as a just act. The U.S.S.R. delegation, therefore, does not seek either an historical or a moral justification for this situation. From the pronouncements of the U.S.S.R. delegation on the problem of Trieste and boundary of the Free Territory it is evident that it does not try to justify the proposals of the Foreign Ministers' Council from the viewpoint of historical justice. On the contrary, the Soviet delegation has qualified them as a minimum of justice. In the particular case the Soviet delegation has been guided by concrete conditions which compel us to seek agreed decisions.

(iii) Italian Fascism in the Julian March

The South African delegation's viewpoint was supported by the Dutch delegation. I shall not deal with all the Dutch arguments in detail, but I shall call attention only to one circumstance. The Dutch delegate referred to Schiffner's book "Around Trieste," and recommended the Yugoslav delegation to cite not only those passages which it liked, but also certain other passages. This advice can be returned to the Dutch delegation: It should cite not only those passages which it likes, but also certain other interest-

ing passages contained in Schiffrer's book. This book, indeed, is not without interest, and it was no accident that in the introduction Count Sforza called it a romance, though he did not specify what romantic element he found in it.

Here is a passage from the chapter of Schiffrer's book dealing with the population of Venezia Julia:—

"If after the incorporation of Istria in the Italian Kingdom," Schiffrer writes, "any régime would have taken the initiative of agrarian reform at a certain sacrifice to an insignificant number of Italian landowners, such a régime would no doubt have gained in stability and prestige. As a by-product, considering the absence of clear-cut national divisions and the wide diffusion of two languages among the Slavs, it could have given the Italian language and culture such an attractive power as to make the entire region Italian in the lifetime of one generation."

This passage is interesting in two aspects. Firstly, it admits that this region, though it could have become Italian, was not Italian.

I would ask the Dutch delegate to explain how this passage in Schiffrer's book should be understood in spite of differences in tastes. (There is much in it which we, too, do not like.)

Secondly, Schiffrer reveals the mechanics of the assimilation of the Julian March by Italian Fascism: "Instead of the Austrian taxation system," he writes, "which was strict in locating sources of taxes but generous in their exaction, the Italian system was based on reverse principles." The author says that the Austrian system was strict. But what can be said of the Italian Fascist system, which was distinguished by reverse principles? Let the Dutch delegate himself reply to this question, proceeding not from my conclusions, which are so much disliked in certain reactionary Italian quarters, but from Schiffrer's words endorsed by Count Sforza where Schiffrer admits that in relation to the Slavs "this system displayed no mercy in exacting taxes from very modest incomes."

Schiffrer states outright that during the first crisis caused by the drop in agricultural prices the small farmers were utterly ruined, especially in the districts of Buie, Montana and Parenzo, inhabited by a Yugoslav majority.

"Numerous lots of land were seized and became the property of certain political-financial adventurers, who flocked from other districts as vultures flock to carrion. These lots went to money-lenders and big landed estates. The Fascist leaders only were able to avert disaster by obtaining big subsidies from the State as premiums for model farming."

This is how the fact was established which Mr. Jordan called a juridical fact. This is how these lands were assimilated by Italy. Schiffrer, whose book was published in 1946, and who is wholly inspired by the desire to defend the interests of the Italian chau-

vinists, uses the following language and comparisons to describe how the Italian capitalists lorded it:—

“The moneylenders and bankers who flocked here like vultures ruined the small and medium farms. They paid no regard either to the interests of agriculture as a whole, or to the interests of those groups of agriculturists who in view of their economic weakness required the most careful handling.”

And what were the results of this policy? I will cite a few more lines from Schiffrer's book: “The most pitiable result of all as regards agriculture was that a great number of peasants, small owners, again found themselves in their former position. One can understand the pent-up hatred of everything Italian—a hatred which broke out with unparalleled savage force in the peasant rebellions in 1943, when the machinery of coercion created by the Fascist State disintegrated.”

This is how Schiffrer described this process of so-called assimilation of Slav land by the Italian Fascist rulers. I would now ask the South African delegation and the Dutch delegation whether they regard this too, as a “juridical fact” that is, a fact which finds justification in law? Do they regard this as lawful, do they regard such a situation as legitimate, do they believe that this process is natural and deserves neither condemnation nor change? And lastly, do they believe that a repetition of the same events as those mentioned by Schiffrer, and which resulted in 1943 in peasant rebellions, represent a solution of the problem?

The Soviet delegation replies to this: No, no, no. This is not a solution of the problem.

(iv) On Western Thrace

I cannot overlook the speech of the South African delegate about the Bulgarian claims to Western Thrace. Mr. Chairman, I would ask you not to interrupt me, because I am only using the right of reciprocity, a natural right even from the viewpoint of complex diplomatic relations. It was said here that to satisfy the Bulgarian claim for the restoration of Western Thrace would mean rewarding Bulgaria for aggression. Everyone knows, however what really constituted Bulgarian aggression. In what form and how did Bulgaria fight against the Great Powers—against the U.S.A., against the Soviet Union? This is well known. Who does not know that not a single Bulgarian soldier fought against America, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.? The alliance between Bulgaria and Germany resembled the alliance between a rider and his horse, when the rider is spurring on a bleeding and sweating animal. They say that to grant Bulgaria's claim to Western Thrace would mean rewarding Bulgaria's aggression in the Second World War. I must express regret at the fact that Mr. Jordan seems not to have had sufficient time go into the essence of this question or, if he was acquainted with it, could not remain as impartial as he promised to be. But in general the mat-

ter does not stand as the South African delegation contends. The point is that the Greek Government of Tsaldaris is encroaching upon Bulgarian territory. It is well known that the Greek delegation made a proposal according to which Mr. Tsaldaris wants to take a quarter of Bulgarian territory for Greece, and this under the pretext of "correcting the frontier."

In accordance with this Greek claim, the Bulgarian frontier would come within 35 kilometres of Plovdiv—Bulgaria's second biggest city—and within not more than 95 kilometres of Sofia, capital of Bulgaria. And they call this a correction of the frontier, and not aggression! Then I must say that we have quite a different conception of what is aggression, and what is not. Bulgaria, on the other hand, in claiming Western Thrace—I must mention it only as a historical reference—demands only annulment of the injustice which was done to her by the Peace Treaty of Neuilly in 1919, when Western Thrace was taken away from her. It is known that Western Thrace was given to Bulgaria by the Bucharest Peace Treaty in 1913; it is known that it was wrested from the Turks at the price of the blood of the Bulgarian people, which made no small sacrifices in its struggle for liberation from the foreign yoke. The Bucharest Peace Treaty did not solve the problem, leaving with Greece such points as Kavalla, Drama, Serrai and the valley of the Struma River—ancient Slav lands. Even under the Bucharest Peace Treaty, which was more just than the Neuilly, Bulgaria was deprived of a free outlet to the sea.

Having wrested Western Thrace from Bulgaria, the Allied Powers failed to fulfil their obligations to guarantee her a free outlet to the Aegean Sea—an obligation laid down in the corresponding Peace Treaty. Moreover, the international control established in its time over Western Thrace, was—as is well known—abolished in May 1920. Thus a completely new injustice was committed. Western Thrace, on the decision of the San Remo Conference, was handed over to Greece; and this was subsequently confirmed by the Treaty of Sevres.

Such was the truly grievous fate of this small Slav country. The International Treaty of the Versailles period was a result of the play of political passions of adventurers. They repeatedly struck heavy blows at the Bulgarian people—one of the glorious representatives of Slav land. Here is the Treaty of Neuilly, here are the Agreements of Sevres and San Remo—the injustice of all struck at the same point. Bulgaria was guaranteed an outlet to the sea, but this outlet was not given; control over Western Thrace was guaranteed, but this control was abolished. So is this a legal act? No, this is an act, but one deprived of all legitimate justification, of all justification in law.

* * *

The Soviet delegation believes that Article 16, which we have

discussed at several meetings, and which has attracted the serious attention of all delegations, each of which has approached this problem from its own position and principle, calls for serious attention and investigation. The Soviet delegation, therefore, hopes that the decision which will be passed on this Article will be one in which there will be taken into account all the remarks made in the entire discussion that has taken place before us, in spite of the errors of certain delegations which tried to defend obviously unjust positions.

The Soviet delegation believes that the remarks of the Yugoslav delegation call for most serious and responsible consideration.

X

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR IN TRIESTE

**Speech at the Meeting of the sub-Committee of the
Political and Territorial Committee for Italy,
appointed to consider the Trieste Statute,
September 20, 1946**

IN order to find our way in the problem we are now discussing, we must be guided by the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Our task is to specify and make precise the fundamental principles already laid down. We are faced with perfectly clear principles formulated by the Council of Foreign Ministers. What are these principles?

Article 16 of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy points out that the Security Council must ensure the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste. It further says that, after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy, the Security Council shall appoint the governor, and that the governor shall submit annual reports to the Security Council.

Thus, the governor is a representative of the Security Council—a representative with restricted powers. He does not take part in legislative activities. He does not take part in the administration of the internal affairs of the Free Territory. He only has to supervise that the statute of the Free Territory is carried out. He is a peculiar kind of governor, without a governor's functions as they are commonly understood. Perhaps it would be more correct even to call him a high commissioner, as proposed in the Yugoslav draft, rather than a governor.

However, I do not at present want to engage in a search for names. I want to request the committee to consider the legal position of the governor of the Free Territory of Trieste from the viewpoint of the tasks with which the governor is charged by decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Soviet delegation proceeds from the principle that the governor is an agent of the Security Council. In this respect, we fully agree with the U.S. delegation, and in particular with the statement of Senator Connally, who, speaking in the Political and Territorial Committee for Italy, defined the governor's role as that of an agent of the Security Council.

It cannot be the governor's function to take part in legislative activities. The U.S. delegation declared that the Free Territory of Trieste should be free in relation to both Yugoslavia and Italy. Permit me to say that it should also be free in relation to the Security Council, in the sense that the Security Council should

not intervene in the domestic affairs of Trieste. The Security Council is only called upon to ensure the integrity and independence of this territory. Still less can the Free Territory be subordinated to the governor, for then we could not speak of independence.

Suffice it to pose the question in this way, in order to understand what nonsense—what a contradiction—is an independent state which depends on a governor.

Is it envisaged that the Security Council will issue laws for the Free Territory? No, this is not envisaged. Will it hand to the legislative assembly directives on various problems of state activities? No, it will not. The Security Council has only assumed the duty of guaranteeing, of ensuring the integrity and independence of the Free Territory. It did not and cannot assume any other duty, as long as it adheres to the principle recognised by the Council of Foreign Ministers. We are setting up independent government machinery. The Free Territory of Trieste, as shown by its very name, adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, should be a genuinely free, democratic state organisation. This is no colony subordinated to a governor appointed by a mother country. This is no "mandated territory" under the Trusteeship Council. This is an independent, free territory, and the Security Council has only assumed the functions of protecting its independence and integrity. This is what should guide us.

Inasmuch as the Security Council restricts its functions in regard to the Free Territory merely to guaranteeing its independence and integrity, this means that the governor's functions should not go beyond this either. The governor will stand on guard over this independence. If any threat to the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste should arise, the governor would have to report it to the Security Council.

As a representative of the Security Council, the governor will have to supervise the observance of the statute of the Free Territory. He will have to see to it that laws which may prove at variance with the statute are not passed. To discharge this function, the governor is furnished with an effective instrument—the right of veto. As provided for by the Soviet draft statute, "before the promulgation of a law, the president of the People's Assembly shall communicate to the governor the text of the law passed by the People's Assembly. Within ten days the governor may return to the People's Assembly the law submitted to him with his remarks or recommendations if, in his opinion, that law contradicts the present statute."

If the People's Assembly disagrees with the governor, it should report on this to the Security Council, which will make a final decision on the disputed issue.

Such are the duties of the governor, as guardian and agent of the Security Council, supervising the observance of the statute.

Does this mean, however, that the governor should take part in executive and legislative activities? No, it does not.

If we imagine that the governor will take part in executive activities, this means that he should be subordinated to the legislative authority, should be responsible to the people's assembly. But then, this means that one fine day the people's assembly could simply discharge the governor. The governor cannot be responsible to the legislative authority, as he is already responsible to the Security Council. In view of this very fact, the Soviet delegation holds that he cannot be a member of the government or preside over the government council. Hence, he cannot enjoy legislative initiative.

The governor should not take part in legislative activities, either.

Legislation is the domestic affair of the Free Territory of Trieste, while the governor should not intervene in domestic affairs.

The French formulation goes further than the other viewpoints—the British and the American—since it does not place any restriction at all on the governor's legislative initiative. The delegations of Great Britain and the U.S.A. restrict this legislative initiative to questions affecting the governor's responsibility to the Security Council. One should, however, be permitted to ask what kind of questions these are. Neither the British nor the American delegation explains this. Yet one is entitled to ask how the definition of the responsibility of the governor to the Security Council, and the eventual shape of relations between the governor and the Security Council concern the Free Territory of Trieste. The Free Territory does not appoint the governor, does not give him instructions, does not demand or receive reports from him. The question of relations between the governor and the Security Council is by no means connected with that of relations between the governor and the legislative assembly.

The question, however, arises—in what way will the governor ensure observance of the statute and help the Security Council in discharging its obligations? The governor is given the right of veto, and this is quite sufficient to enable him to discharge his duties and fully to ensure observance by the Security Council of the obligations with which it is charged on the strength of paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Thus the governor is furnished with an effective instrument for settling legislative affairs. Yet this is an emergency instrument. The governor cannot resort to the right of veto always and in all circumstances.

But, enjoying as he does the right of veto, the governor does not need the right of legislative initiative to discharge his duties. There are other reasons, too, why he should not have this right.

Supposing the governor is granted the right of legislative initiative. On the strength of this he may submit his bills to the

people's assembly. Supposing he submitted a bill, and the people's assembly declined this bill—turned it down. The governor submits another bill; again it is turned down. If the governor's bills are turned down one after another his prestige will be undermined. His relations with the people's assembly will then become of a rather unpleasant kind. And his situation will be, as they say, "worse than a governor's"—with us, this means the very worst of situations. Why should we place the governor in such a situation?

[Mr. Tyshinsky proposed that, in exact conformity with the principle adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and expressed in Article 16 of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy, the governor should not be granted the right of legislative initiative]

XI

EXCHANGE OF POPULATION BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY

**Speech at the Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary,
September 20, 1946**

MR. CHAIRMAN, the question raised by the Czechoslovak delegation at the Paris Conference is an important and serious one, which already has its history. Even without reiterating what has been dwelt on here in detail, one can say without exaggeration that no few facts have been cited here and no few data, estimates and considerations have been submitted to the Committee. Although emanating from divergent standpoints and based on contradictory principles, they yet furnish sufficient grounds for the Committee to arrive at some or another conclusion and decision on the proposal submitted by the Czechoslovak delegation.

Without going too far back in tracing the developments of the so-called problem of the national Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, if we restrict ourselves to a period closer to the present day, it suffices to recall only the negotiations between the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments in 1945 and 1946, for this question—the question of transfer of the Hungarian section of the population of Czechoslovakia from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, and of the Slovak section of the population of Hungary from Hungary to Czechoslovakia—to be decided in such a way as to satisfy the aspirations of the Czechoslovak Government, whose policy proceeds from democratic principles.

As is well known, the Czechoslovak Government tried to find a solution of the question of transfer of the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia to Hungary on the basis of an agreement between the two countries through bilateral negotiations between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments. This was a correct and wise step, fully conforming to the democratic principles guiding the Czechoslovak Government, which—particularly of late—has travelled a long road of developing democracy and fortifying democratic principles in its country. It is quite natural that the measures undertaken by the Czechoslovak Government in 1945 to decide this really important question in a friendly way—no one can deny this—with the Hungarian Government fully corresponded to its position based on the principles which the Czechoslovak democratic Government is seeking to implement in all its activities, and in the sphere of foreign relations in particular.

The Soviet Government possesses considerable experience in solving national problems, in settling questions connected with problems of national minorities. The settlement of these questions in the Soviet Union is ensured by the correctness of the national policy pursued in the Soviet Union, based on the high principles of the doctrine of Lenin and Stalin. Soviet foreign policy, like Soviet internal national policy, is inspired by the lofty ideals of equality and fraternity and relies precisely on the principle of respect for the equality of nations, of respect for the principle of national self-determination. The Leninist-Stalinist national policy has secured the successful development of the economic life of the numerous nationalities inhabiting our country, and a rich blossoming of national culture in the broadest sense of the word. As a result, the creative forces latent in the depth of the national life of the sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics, and the peoples inhabiting these Republics, have undergone a brilliant and rich development, which has served as a worthy reward to the leaders of the Soviet State for their practical activities in the sphere of Socialist construction. It is precisely on the basis of this respect for the principle of national self-determination, the principle of respect for the equality of peoples, that Soviet foreign policy is built—yielding results which allow the Soviet Union to regard itself as sufficiently competent on the questions which at present concern our respected assembly. On this basis stand the international treaties and agreements which have been concluded by the Soviet Union with other states. On this basis stand the economic, political and other agreements concluded by the Soviet Union, including such as are directly related to the problem which concerns our Committee. I am speaking of agreements referring to matters of resettlement, repatriation and option, and to problems connected with settling these difficult tasks, because questions of option, citizenship, repatriation and resettlement are no easy ones. I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the example given by such a document as the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 6, 1945, on the strength of which over one million people have been transferred from the Soviet Union to Poland within these one and a-half years, and hundreds of thousands of people of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Russian and other nationalities have been transferred from Poland to the U.S.S.R. This Agreement is based on those principles which I have just mentioned, and therefore it is quite natural for the Soviet Government to endorse any efforts on the part of the governments of other countries exerted towards the realisation of these same principles of mutual respect and desire for fraternal collaboration.

That is, why the negotiations undertaken in 1945 between the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments, which ended in the Agreement of February 27, 1946, represented a fact of a positive character, which inspired great hopes in those who value the

practical realisation of those principles which are proclaimed in programmes. Unfortunately one has to admit that the above-mentioned Agreement failed to yield the necessary results. And therefore this problem, which ought to have been settled by means of the negotiations that were crowned by that Agreement, was not settled—at any rate, this problem is not settled at present. I believe that each one of use should quite clearly ask himself: How to act henceforth. We should not lose hope and abandon all further attempts at solving this question, which has attained a certain weight and importance both for the Czechoslovak Republic and for the entire world—for it is of international importance. It should be clear that a correct or incorrect solution of this question cannot but have grave results, because the international relations between two governments, which are not isolated from the entire world but included in the system of international relations, are involved. This cannot but have a reflection on the sum total of international relations, just as a stone thrown on to the calm surface of a pond cannot but cause waves radiating out towards the shore. The question has not been settled. The Czechoslovak Government is trying to settle this question. It is seeking an agreement. It desires an agreement, strives towards an agreement, signs an agreement, yet the agreement is not being realised.

A strange situation arises. We, the Soviet Union for instance, desire that our people who are now abroad—and, unfortunately, are very often artificially kept from returning to our country—should return to our country. We need these people because they are our own people, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone. But evidently the Hungarian Government maintains a different stand. It is given the offer of getting back 200,000 people. Nevertheless it says: "We do not want to take them, we have no need of these people, they will be a burden to us." It is as if the mother of a big family distributed her children among the neighbours and refused to rear them herself on the grounds that these children would be a burden to her, a heavy burden, and therefore it was better to shove these children off on to the neighbours, hoping that someone would look after them. Is it not a strange position? I believe it strange. How does the Czechoslovak Government react to this? I believe it reacts correctly. The Soviet Government believes that one of the possible solutions of the national problem, under conditions where national interests are in conflict, is to free one country from persons of the nationality of the other country, and to settle those persons properly at home, in their homeland. That is how matters stand at the present time. I think no one can deny that this position is well-grounded. I think that no one can hardly approve of the position taken up by the government of any country when it does everything—not in order to secure the return of the children of its people from abroad—but on the contrary to convert these

children of its people into stepsons forsaken in foreign countries.

The question of resettling Hungarians from Czechoslovakia has not been settled, and the Agreement which came as a result of the bilateral negotiations has not been realised. I shall not dwell on the history of this question. Much has been said about this earlier in the Committee as well as in the press. I am stressing here only the fact that the settling of this acute question, which is becoming ever more acute, concerning the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, has not been secured. Consequently there are two prospects—either to let this matter drift in its own way, to step aside and let events develop according to the “laissez faire, laissez passer” principle, or, as the Russian saying goes, to let matters go as they go and God Almighty take care of them, for it is none of our business; or, on the contrary, to interfere, to take the matter under our control and help that side which is exerting every effort to solve the problem. It seems to me that once we put the question in this way, and as soon as we mention these, so to say, two prospects, we shall see that actually there can be no two solutions here, and that the second solution alone can give hope of positive results.

What are the grounds, then, for the Czechoslovak Government to insist on deporting the Hungarian minority from its country? Are there any such grounds? The Soviet delegation believes that these grounds exist. We can observe these grounds in the history which has been referred to by the representatives of the Czechoslovak delegation here—but I hardly need to mention the names of all sorts of Esterhazys and other gentlemen in order to restore to memory the facts that have been mentioned here. This is a past stage in the Committee's work. I can simply make the fact clear, believing that the motives by which the Czechoslovak Government is guided in its proposal on measures to make the Hungarian Government in the long run resettle the sons of its people in its own territory, merit every attention.

What are these motives? Firstly, the Czechoslovak Government asserts and cites idubitable facts—and to-day, too, these facts have been reiterated by Mr. Klementis—that in the past, in the years of the Munich tragedy through which Czechoslovakia passed, the Hungarian minority played a negative part, siding with Henlein and Frank—the executioners of the Czechoslovak people, who rebelled against Czechoslovakia's independence, Czechoslovakia's statehood, Czechoslovakia's freedom. I do not want to abuse your time, but if we were to refer to data published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union containing documents on German policy in regard to Hungary, documents captured by our troops in Ribbentrop's files in Berlin, then this would make clear what were the true motivating forces operating in the upper circles of Hungary, determining the entire trend of Hungarian policy in regard to Czechoslovakia. Suffice it to mention Document No. 3 in the above-mentioned file, which

reproduces conversations between Hitler and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, von Kanya, in November, 1937.

We may find the following lines in that document: "He (Hitler) suggested that Hungary should not disperse her political efforts in various directions, but should direct them along one line only, namely, towards Czechoslovakia. Von Kanya replied that Hungary holds the same viewpoint."

After this, it becomes clear that truth is on the side of the Czechoslovak Republic. An hour ago our Committee passed a decision to include in Article 4 of the draft Peace Treaty with Hungary an addendum prohibiting revisionist propaganda. Since the Committee has accepted this amendment, which forbids Hungary and holds her answerable for allowing propaganda of revisionist nature, i.e., propaganda aimed at revision of the frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, what does this mean in fact? What can it mean except recognition of the fact that Hungary cherishes plans for annexing from Czechoslovakia part of the Czechoslovak land? It means that revisionist tendencies in Hungary and among the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia are alive, and that here we observe a threat to peace, to peaceful relations. At the same time it means that these revisionist tendencies and aspirations, this constant incitement of public opinion with ideas of revenge, create a danger and cannot be tolerated. It means that the Czechoslovak Government, when insisting on its proposals maintain, a clear view ahead.

The question discussed here concerns the peace and security, not of Czechoslovakia alone, but of the whole of Europe and the entire world. This is true if only for one reason, that Czechoslovakia is situated at the crossing of big European roads.

The Soviet delegation believes that the Czechoslovak Government is right when it states that Hungary's stand is pregnant with a constant threat to international security. It cannot be denied that the stand taken by the Hungarian Government in regard to Czechoslovakia was no accidental episode in the history of the relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This stand is conditioned by a number of objective reasons, the roots of which lie in the ties between the ruling circles of old Hungary and German imperialism on the one hand, and in the militaristic aspirations of these circles, guided by the insane idea of a great Hungarian kingdom, on the other hand.

The existence of revisionist plans of revenge which have not so far been repudiated by influential circles of Hungary even after they have gone through the military disaster of recent years and after Hungary has become a democratic country—this deserves every praise—serves as one of the serious reasons which have compelled the Czechoslovak Government to raise in the way it has done the question of the resettlement of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. The issue under consideration is a resettlement which has been called "forcible." Attempts to agree about

voluntary resettlement yielded no result. In fact the question has been raised of obligatory resettlement. This is a serious measure of course, but it proves to be inevitable, it has arisen from the entire course of events, from the very essence of the relations that have crystallised in Czechoslovakia between one section of the population of Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians, and the rest, the overwhelming majority of that population represented by Czechoslovaks. We are told that this measure will spell disaster for Hungary, and that Hungary, even if we recognise all these arguments as just and founded, will not be able to cope with this task without falling into the abyss.

I think that such an interpretation is wrong and highly exaggerated, and is rather made for the sake of propaganda and with a view to evading the necessity of accepting 200,000 Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. Evidently this exaggeration is meant to serve those who still continue to dream of a great Hungarian kingdom.

A struggle by means of figures, a struggle in which diverse weapons are employed, is in progress here. The Czechoslovak Government is bombarding the Hungarian positions with its statistics, the Hungarian Government is bombarding the Czechoslovak positions with its statistics: both sides call the figures presented by the other side falsified; and I do not know how to get to the bottom of these figures here. Yet, if we leave aside this controversy and formulate the task confronting us, it should be said that the issue under consideration concerns the resettlement of 200,000 Hungarians resettled from Czechoslovakia? The Hungarian Government says that there is no place for them in Hungary.

Now, is there room or is there none? Let us take one fact—500,000 Germans have to be resettled from Hungary into the American zone in Germany; I am very glad that present here is Mr. Smith, who knows this very well from his own experience of military work in Germany. Here is the endorsed plan of the Control Council for Germany. Five hundred thousand Germans are to be resettled from Hungary into the American zone of Germany. Next question if these 500,000 men are resettled from Hungary to Germany, will there or will there not be room in Hungary for 200,000 Hungarians resettled from Czechoslovakia? I think there will be such room. We should remember that by September 1, 1946, only 136,847 people, or 27.4 per cent. of the scheduled number, had been resettled from Hungary to Germany in connection with the plan which I have just mentioned. Consequently, if the established plan of resettling Germans from Hungary is fulfilled, it will provide a perfect opportunity to resettle Hungarians from Czechoslovakia in their place. Consequently nothing should prevent the Hungarian Government from admitting Hungarians in place of Germans. It is strange that, under such conditions, the proposal of the Czechoslovak Govern-

ment should meet with such opposition from the Hungarian Government.

Mr. Szegedi, speaking here on behalf of the Hungarian delegation, tried to convince the Committee that the Czechoslovak Government had submitted a proposal running counter to the idea of peace, which should not be a heavy vengeful peace but must be permeated with the spirit of justice. He said that the proposal of the Czechoslovak Government was aimed at making Hungary the scapegoat for Munich. Can this objection be recognised as serious? No, it cannot. Such an objection could be dictated only by a lack of desire to transfer Hungarian people from Czechoslovakia, or in other words, by a desire to leave them in Czechoslovakia at any price. They say: "But these Hungarians are settled on the land, they are tilling that land, and now they have to abandon everything and move over to another place." This is true. It is not easy. But it is inevitable. And lastly, it is just.

If the Czechoslovak Government were to demand that the Hungarian Government deport 200,000 Hungarians from Hungary, it would be quite another matter. But the question stands differently. The point is that Hungary should admit Hungarians into Hungary.

It seems to me that the arguments to the contrary are of an artificial character. All these measures are spoken about and presented as an "inhuman act." Yet what is the point of the Czechoslovak Government's proposal? The Czechoslovak Government's proposal aims in the first place at settling this question on principle, that is, to tell the Hungarian Government that it is obliged to effect such a settlement. The Czechoslovak Government said in its proposal that it, in its turn undertakes to conclude a certain agreement with the Hungarian Government, based on the respect for the personal and property rights of the Hungarian population in conformity with the terms of the Agreement of February 27 on exchange of population. And this is called "forcible resettlement."

Clearly there is nothing here resembling an "inhuman act," as the Hungarian delegation said to the Committee. And we are convinced that the Czechoslovak Government will fulfil its promise. We are reassured in this also by the concluding words of Mr. Klementis: "I declare," he said, "on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak delegation, that we undertake here at the Paris Conference and before world public opinion to conduct the resettlement by methods conforming to the humane principles which make Czechoslovakia an island of order in Central Europe."

I know that words pronounced in the halls of the Luxembourg Palace are not empty words, and this still further impels us Soviet people and the Soviet delegation to support the Czechoslovak Government's proposal.

XII
CITIZENSHIP IN THE TERRITORY
BEING TRANSFERRED FROM ITALY
TO ALLIED STATES

Speech at the Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy,
September 21, 1946

THE Soviet Delegation, considers the Greek amendment unacceptable. The whole question is one of dates. The draft Peace Treaty said that Italian citizens who had been in permanent residence on June 10, 1940, in the territory now being transferred to another State would become citizens of that State with full rights. The Greek delegation, however, is proposing to put back that date 34 years—to May 5, 1912. The resulting difference is one of nearly one-and-a-half generations. The measure proposed by the Greek delegation assumes the character of an act of cruelty and vindictiveness towards the Italian population. One could not agree with such a demand.

The American amendment is nothing more than an expression of ill-concealed mistrust of the States to whom particular parts of Italian territory are being transferred. This incidentally is very well understood by the French delegate Couve de Murville but he has been inconsistent in his actions. Couve de Murville has said that the American proposal is unnecessary; but for some reason he has not ventured to object to this unnecessary addendum.

I should have said that such a definition of the American amendment is too mild. I would go further, and say that the amendment proposed by the delegation of the U.S.A. is not only unnecessary but harmful. This amendment very noticeably infringes the interests of France, Yugoslavia and Greece.

It is up to the French delegation to agree or disagree with such an amendment. It is up to the French delegation to accept this amendment if it likes. But we do not like this amendment, as it violates the sovereign rights of other states. But, as they say, you cannot argue about tastes. The amendment proposed by the U.S.A. violates the sovereign rights of independent States.

Is it necessary to accept this amendment of Article 13 as proposed by the American delegation, and what does this amendment represent? In order to give a precise answer to this question one has to compare Article 13 with Article 14, which deals with the measures which Italy will be obliged to take to ensure to persons under Italian jurisdiction the rights of man and the basic freedoms. If the American amendment is compared with Article 14, we can see that there is absolutely no difference between them.

Comparing these two texts, one is convinced that there is no difference between these Articles. If we accept the U.S. proposal, we shall say that the corresponding part of Article 13 wholly repeats Article 14, with the sole difference that Article 14 addresses one country and paragraph 4 of Article 13 a different one. Article 14 is addressed to a former enemy country, and paragraph 4 of Article 13 to Allied friendly states belonging to the United Nations.

The Soviet delegation feels that it would be absolutely wrong to apply to Allied Powers obligations imposed upon a former enemy country. That would be to distort the perspective, to place Allied Powers in this respect on the same plane with Italy, a former enemy country, a former ally of Germany, which for a certain period requires control regarding questions involving the realisation of broad democratic principles.

We should not forget that the survivals of Fascism have by no means been eradicated in Italy. Only yesterday the press reported that the Secretary of the Italian Republican Party, Randolfo Pacciardi, on behalf of the party's parliamentary group and leadership, sent a letter to the prime minister, de Gasperi, expressing dissatisfaction with the government's policy and formulating conditions of further participation of the Republican Party in the Coalition. This is unquestionably an internal affair of the Italians. But what the Secretary of the Republican Party says about the situation in Italy is important for us. Here is his statement: "Monarchist and Fascist groups are openly working for the destruction of the Republic. Key positions in the administration are held by enemies of the Republican system, who sabotage the Ministers' efforts." Pacciardi demands measures such as taking political steps against the Fascist press pending the adoption of a new press law, drastic revision of the personnel of the Foreign Ministry both within the country and abroad, removal of Fascist generals from leading positions in military Ministries, and so on.

Thus the leader of the Italian Republican Party, Randolfo Pacciardi, testifies that the Italian Fascists are undermining the basis of the Republic, that they still hold important offices in the administration, that they sabotage the Ministers' efforts to ensure a regeneration of the country.

Can the situation in France and Yugoslavia be compared in any degree with such a situation? The very idea of such a comparison would be insulting to these Allied Powers.

I shall say that the adoption of the U.S. delegation's amendment could not be regarded in any other way than as a blow at the United Nations Organisation. The adoption of this proposal would be a very grave error on the part of our Committee and of the Conference as a whole if we follow this path.

The Yugoslav delegate, Dr. Brebler, said that the Yugoslav constitution ensures all the rights mentioned in the American

amendment. This is correct. Let us recall the articles of this Constitution. For instance, Article 21 of the Yugoslav Constitution says:

"All citizens of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia are equal before the law, irrespective of nationality, race or religion.

"No privileges ensuing from birth, rank, property, status or education are recognised.

"Any act giving privilege to citizens or restricting their rights by virtue of nationality, race or religion, or any instigation to national, racial or religious enmity and discord, is recognised as contradicting the Constitution and is punishable."

One might also mention Article 27 on freedom of the press, speech, association, assembly and demonstration, Article 25 on freedom of conscience and religion, Article 28 guaranteeing personal immunity, Article 29 on inviolability of the home, Article 13 on safeguarding the rights of the national minorities in Yugoslavia.

Why, in view of the existence of such constitutional guarantees, is it necessary to include in the peace treaty the same obligations regarding an Allied Power as we enter in it regarding Italy—a former enemy country—in which the threat of Fascism still exists, undermining the foundations of the Republic as Pacciardi has declared?

The Polish delegate correctly called attention to the United Nations Charter, sealed by the signatures of all the Allied Powers.

I will recall Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which has not been mentioned. Article 2 says that the present Charter gives no right to the United Nations Organisation to interfere in matters which essentially belong to the domestic competence of this or that State.

But is it not a fact that what the United States proposes represents a direct interference in the domestic affairs of the United Nations? One cannot help wondering at the fact that certain independent sovereign States fail to see the danger awaiting them, and with which they will be faced, if the amendment upon which the United States delegation insists is accepted.

The Soviet delegation feels that the proposal of the U.S. delegation contradicts the principles of state sovereignty and democracy and because of this it insists that this proposal be turned down.

To adopt the U.S. delegation's proposal would be a great error, and therefore it is the duty of those concerned for maintaining faith in the Conference to warn the Conference against a step which would represent a serious blow in the first place to its own prestige. The Soviet delegation will vote against the U.S. delegation's proposal, and invites its colleagues to do likewise.

XIII
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE TO
THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ON THE TERRITORIES
OF EX-ENEMY COUNTRIES

**Speech at the Committee on Economic Questions Relating
to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland,
September 26, 1946**

OUR Committee has given sufficient attention to a very important problem, namely that of compensation. True, by to-day's meeting this problem has already to a considerable extent lost its former acute nature, since the American delegation has renounced its initial position—that is, the demand for full compensation. It is well known that the Soviet delegation, in formulating its proposals to Article 24, pointed out that in view of the number of circumstances, and in particular of the fact that Rumania did not merely withdraw from the war against the United Nations but took an active part in the war against Germany on the side of the United Nations, she should not compensate damage caused to property of the United Nations in full measure and to the full extent.

The Soviet Government believed that this would be unfair, and that on the contrary justice demanded that the amount of compensation be restricted. This is the principle that the Soviet Government follows in regard to reparations. The Soviet Union suffered tremendous losses in this war and, in particular, through Rumania's fault. Rumanian armies invaded the Soviet Union, occupied a certain territory in the south of the Ukraine, took part in the invasion, in the plunder of Soviet property, in the destruction of Soviet wealth, in the extermination of human beings whose lives certainly cannot be compensated by any payments in the way of restitution or reparations. Nevertheless it is well known that the Soviet Government has generously agreed to only partial compensation of its losses, which actually exceed the total of reparation payments five-fold. In these circumstances, it is quite natural, legitimate, just and logical that once a certain principle of compensation of losses and damages has been established in regard to reparations, no departure should be made from this principle in regard to compensation for damage in any other case, including compensation for damage caused to the property of the United Nations on the territory of Rumania.

It is, therefore, surprising that the American delegation took up a different attitude at the Conference, arguing together with

the British delegation and the delegations of other countries supporting them, that in this case the principle of full compensation was to be applied.

This, however, is devoid of any logic, although the controversy on this point is probably already more than one year old. But now this controversy has disappeared: the American delegation no longer insists on full compensation. Consequently we may record the triumph of the principle which was advocated by the Soviet delegation. It seems all the more surprising that the representative of the U.S. delegation, Mr. Thorpe, chose as the subject of his speech questions which have no connection whatever with that controversy.

One might have expected that Mr. Thorpe would either defend the American proposal on full compensation, or explain why the U.S. delegation renounced it. Actually, however, Mr. Thorpe said nothing on this subject. He did not utter a single word concerning compensation. In his long and unfair speech, Mr. Thorpe dealt with different subjects—with the allegedly unbearable burden imposed upon Rumania by the Armistice terms. Mr. Thorpe, however, forgot that these terms had been signed on behalf of the U.S.A. and Great Britain as well as on behalf of the U.S.S.R. These terms were also accepted by Rumania because they are fair and generous. Rumania is conscientiously observing these terms, being considerably assisted by the unceasing aid rendered her by the Soviet Union. Indeed, under the Armistice terms Rumania was obliged to pay reparations to the Soviet Union over a period of six years. The Soviet Government extended the time for these payments to eight years, freed Rumania from a fine for belated payment of reparations, and accorded her a number of other privileges. What were the difficulties, then, mentioned here by Mr. Thorpe so boldly?

[Tyshinsky then gave a detailed analysis of the figures cited by the U.S. representative showing that they were selected without due consideration to their actual meaning and were arbitrary and tendentious.]

The figures mentioned by the representative of the U.S.A. have in a number of cases been exaggerated quite arbitrarily and, in a number of other cases, written down just as arbitrarily—according to what seemed advantageous to Mr. Thorpe and the American delegation.

Approaching figures in the way Mr. Thorpe approaches them, one can certainly prove whatever one pleases. One only has to do it adroitly. The representative of the American delegation, however, did not display any particular adroitness either. The Soviet delegation must resolutely object to such a free way of handling figures as Mr. Thorpe permits himself, all the more so since his statistical exercises are absolutely unconnected with any practical task facing our Committee, as, properly speaking, that task has already been accomplished.

Mr. Thorpe has evidently been misled by relying upon adul-

terated information. As a result he finds himself in a position which could scarcely be regarded as that of the representative of a friendly country.

Mr. Thorpe's speech gave the impression of having been dictated by a desire to question the legitimate right of the Soviet Union to compensation for damage caused by the war. Mr. Thorpe himself was compelled to admit in his speech that he did not possess exact figures or exact facts. Yet he found it possible to draw profoundly unjust conclusions from his dubious data.

That is why we reject these estimations and conclusions, all this adulterated material, unworthy of mutual relations between friendly States.

Speaking here on behalf of the American delegation, Mr. Thorpe tried to criticise the implementation by the Rumanian Government of Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Armistice Agreement of September 12, 1945. However, Mr. Thorpe's utterances on this subject only go to prove that he is indifferent to the losses caused to the Soviet people by the war imposed upon them by Hitler Germany and her accomplices, of whom Antonescu's Rumania was by no means the least important at that time.

And this is not surprising. The Americans did not experience the horrors of foreign invasion, and they scarcely understand what it means, because the enemy did not trample their fields, did not ruin their towns and villages, did not destroy their houses and property, did not cause the death of thousands upon thousands of people—women and children, healthy and sick, young and old. Our country was devastated by war, for the U.S.A. the war was a source of enrichment, of the accumulation of profits.

For instance, in 1943 the American Oil Company in Rumania, Romana-Americana, received 726 million lei profit, while another American company, Astra-Romana, reaped a profit of 846 million lei. Now the American delegation is clamouring about the losses of American oil kings and barons in Rumania, and demands compensation for their damages. And what about profits? They are passed over in silence. Well, companies do business in order to get profits. That is perfectly clear. But this happened in 1943—that is, at a time when those very Romana-Americana and Astra-Romana companies were trading with the Germans, amassing fortunes in the war against us, growing rich together with the Germans on our blood, on our destruction, on the deaths of our brothers, fathers, sons, daughters, wives and mothers. This is the source of their profits. This is what Mr. Thorpe has forgotten, and about which the entire American delegation has kept silent. It engaged in talk about the burden of material obligations, resorting to unreliable facts and arbitrary figures received from unreliable sources and unscrupulous informers.

Mr. Thorpe said here that in the U.S.A. they were accustomed whenever possible to facts and figures in deciding questions of politics.

We have seen these "facts and figures," and we have been able to find out what they are worth. They are cheap, I must say.

"We are presenting the result of an investigation to the members of the Committee," Mr. Thorpe declared.

It sounds great. But in reality it has transpired that this so-called investigation is nothing but a miserable crib, made up of phrases extracted from the inferior memoranda of Rumanian experts, lent for the duration of the Conference to the American delegation by notorious "leaders" from the camp of Maniu, Mihalace, Gafencu and others.

But the American delegation was compelled to say that it really did not possess exact facts and figures. After such a frank admission, there is nothing to talk about any longer.

The U.S. delegate, Mr. Thorpe, had nothing to say in his own justification, and confined himself to general phrases. Mr. Thorpe admitted that for several months the U.S. delegation had not agreed to the proposal of the Soviet delegation on partial compensation of damage sustained by citizens of the United Nations who own property on territory of former enemy countries. Now, however, "under the weight of irrefutable facts," the U.S. delegation renounces its former viewpoint.

Mr. Thorpe's words were of no importance, as he could not justify what he said in his speech of September 23. Mr. Thorpe says that now the U.S. delegation has been convinced by facts; but the same facts existed several months ago as well. It is strange that now the very same facts have proved capable of convincing Mr. Thorpe.

You have stated that you subordinate facts to policy, whereas we believe that policy is to be subordinated to facts. This is more correct and more dignified.

XIV
STATUTE OF THE FREE TERRITORY
OF TRIESTE

**Speech at the Committee on Political and Territorial
Questions of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy,
October 3, 1946**

WE possess data on the Trieste statute in great abundance, but the shortcoming of this material is that it is not systematised. Unfortunately, the same has to be said of the report submitted to us by the Sub-Committee for the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste. Nevertheless one cannot fail to discern two clear-cut tendencies in these data. One tendency aims at consolidating and developing all those principles of democracy which have already been established by the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, namely, in the draft of Article 16 and, more precisely, in its sixth paragraph. The other tendency, I shall permit myself to say—disregarding diplomatic niceties—is directed against this desire to fortify and develop the principles of democracy in Trieste. This is perfectly evident from the Sub-Committee's report itself. The stand adopted by the three delegations—of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France as the rapporteur Mr. Starr-Busman (Netherlands) stated and as is recorded in the report, would give the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste a more limited nature than is customary nowadays for the statute of an ordinary State. This was said literally in the Sub-Committee's report. If you refer to the Sub-Committee's report on the statute of the free territory you will easily find in it this frank confession. It proves that the three delegations—those of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France—have exerted efforts in order to make the statute of the **Free Territory of Trieste** not at all resemble that statute of an "ordinary State." And what sort of State is an "ordinary State," if not a democratic State? An ordinary State is a democratic State, a State based on the principles of democracy. Nevertheless, as admitted by the Sub-Committee's report, the delegations of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France were striving to make the statute of Trieste one of a character as limited as possible compared to the practice of an ordinary democratic State. It is precisely this tendency, which is directed, not towards developing democratic principles, as has been established by Article 16 of the draft of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but, on the contrary, towards the greatest possible restriction of these principles. This ten-

gency runs completely counter to the basic task put before us in the draft elaborated by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

It must be said that this has become very clear also as regards the extent of the Governor's power, which according to these three drafts—not excluding the draft submitted to-day by M. Couve de Murville on behalf of the French delegation—is characterised by broadness and scope. The Governor's power becomes hypertrophied. Indeed, he, the Governor, is entrusted with ensuring peace and security on the Free Territory of Trieste; it is not the Security Council but precisely the Governor who is supposed literally to load with benefits this entire territory. He, the Governor, is entrusted with exercising care for the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste. He is furnished for this purpose with the corresponding so-called "means" in the form of gendarmerie, police and—as frankly stated in the British draft of September 27, distributed here and devoted to the question of the temporary regime in Trieste—all sorts of military installations, fortifications and so on. So this is what the democracy of a non-ordinary State means: military installations, fortifications, troops and so on. The British draft fails to explain against whom these military measures are intended. Replying to this question, one cannot but remember that this Governor, armed to the teeth, is being opposed to the unarmed people of the future so-called Free Territory of Trieste. We cannot agree with this idea of a democratic statute and of democracy in general. We must reject all such drafts and, moreover, we cannot fail to reject them unless we abandon the generally accepted idea of democracy, unless we abandon the principles established by the Council of Foreign Ministers and unless we ignore the lawful and just demands of the Trieste people. That is why we cannot consent either to the draft of the delegations of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, or to the majority of principles contained in the new draft submitted by M. Couve de Murville. All the more is this the case, since what is acceptable in them has already been formulated in the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, while what has been added proves to be utterly unacceptable. Here are some examples.

The first paragraph of the French project says that the Security Council ensures the integrity and independence of the free territory. This is correct, and should be accepted. Later, however it says that the Security Council is entrusted with maintaining public order. Where has this been taken from? The second paragraph of the Council of Foreign Ministers decision says nothing about the maintenance of public order by the Security Council, but only that the latter provides for the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste. But this is quite a different matter.

We cannot agree with clauses that provide for such a wide scope of the Governor's administrative authority. Such wide

powers make the Governor the supreme government authority, an executive competing with the government itself, which is incompatible with the principle of the State independence of the Free Territory of Trieste. We stand by the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers which provided for the setting up of a democratic State with power vested in the people and the organs responsible to the people. I believe it was no accident that the remark "what does the people need this authority for?" came from the seats of the British delegation here. A strange remark to be sure. I shall reply to it. The Popular Assembly should be granted authority because popular authority must exist in Trieste.

The Popular Assembly must exercise legislative authority in Trieste. This authority must be and will be democratic, and not bureaucratic. We are not against establishing an executive authority responsible to the people; on the contrary, we are in favour of establishing an executive authority responsible to the people which will express its will through the National Assembly. The British, American and French drafts recognise this in principle. Indeed, how would they object to it! But that is only how matters are formulated in words. Actually, genuine executive authority is surrendered by these drafts to the Governor, who is in no way responsible to the Popular Assembly. And you do not object to this! You—the representatives of Western and American democracy—who recognise both the division of authority and the responsibility of the Government to the Popular Assembly, a Parliament, Chamber of Deputies or whatever it may be called! But we are against these proposals, as they represent a rude violation of the fundamental rights of the people, the very principles of democracy.

We cannot permit that this executive authority should be exercised by the Governor. We cannot agree that this should be his function. Why not? Because the Governor is the guardian and keeper of the statute. He must, while representing the Security Council, see to it that the statute is complied with in accordance with those principles of the integrity and independence of the free territory that have been proclaimed in the draft of the Council of Foreign Ministers and formulated in Article 16 of the draft Peace Treaty with Italy. Therefore, the stand so persistently defended by the representatives of the three delegations—the U.S.A., Great Britain and France—supported by the Dutch and Australian delegations, seeking such wide authority for the Governor, is utterly impermissible and incomprehensible from the standpoint of democratic principles. Only a few days ago these delegations were seeking to make the Governor President of the Government Council, to make him head of the Government Council or, in other words, the Government.

I see that, in the latest document, neither the British nor the American or French delegations support this proposal any longer.

They have abandoned it. That is a progressive step. But those delegations did defend that proposal for a long time, arguing that it was a necessary expedient, and that it was reasonable for the Governor to be President of the Government Council responsible to the Legislative Assembly, while he himself would not be responsible to this Legislative Assembly. Actually it would mean distorting the principle of democracy, and we were and remain against such a distortion. However, even according to the French draft submitted to-day, and which the French delegation recommends as some kind of compromise, extraordinarily wide powers are retained for the Governor. The same applies to the drafts submitted by the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

Take, for instance, the question of appointing judges. The appointment of judges by the Governor runs counter to the principles of democracy. The Soviet Constitution says that judges are independent and responsible only to the law, and this is correct, conforming with the principles of democracy. But you want to delegate to the Governor authority to appoint judges, and this is what you call democracy! That kind of democracy we call bureaucracy. Those are the principles of bureaucracy, not of democracy. Therefore, we utter a warning against principles of this sort. We reject these principles as a method of setting up legal bodies.

Lastly, we come to the question of the demilitarisation and neutrality of the Free Territory of Trieste. The French draft says that this Territory should be demilitarised, without mentioning, however, that foreign forces must be withdrawn. Instead, the French draft adds that troops may be introduced there by the Security Council. For what reason, however, should such principles be included in the statute, since the Security Council can introduce its troops into any territory of any State on the conditions established by the United Nations Charter? It is not clear that such an addition to the text elaborated by the Council of Foreign Ministers is particularly intended to present the situation in Trieste as a confused one, requiring extraordinary police measures? For it was the representative of Great Britain who said here that democracy should be restricted in Trieste because strikes, murders, and so on, are occurring there. But, as is known, it is not only in Trieste that murders are committed. Not a few murders are committed in Western and trans-Atlantic States. As regards strikes, if we adopt the viewpoint of the British delegate, all democratic rights and civil freedoms should be abolished in America, since strikes occur there day in and day out, such as Trieste has never dreamt of. The reference to strikes, therefore, as a reason for restricting democracy is of an utterly artificial nature. This argument is meant somehow to justify a restriction of the principles of democracy, to justify the extraordinary police powers of the Governor, and to ensure that this nascent democratic territory shall not resemble a genuine demo-

cratic State. This is where drafts submitted by the U.S.A., Britain and France are trying to drag us back, by opposing the omnipotent authority of the Governor to a powerless People's Assembly and the people itself. These drafts prove that these delegations have lost the correct path.

We, the Soviet delegation, are defending the proposal of the Council of Ministers and suggest that the work of this Committee should conclude by the adoption of an article that will correspond to the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. We suggest that the other articles should not be considered here, but should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers, so that the latter can complete the settlement of this question in a calmer and less hasty atmosphere. We believe that in such a case it would be possible to find ways and means that would assist in arriving at a successful settlement of this difficult, yet important and highly responsible, problem.

XV

THE PEACE TREATY WITH BULGARIA

Speech at the Plenary Session,

October 11, 1946

OUR work is approaching its end.

After considering the draft Peace Treaties with Italy and Rumania, the plenary session of the Conference has approached the work of drafting the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(i) For a Just and Democratic Peace with Bulgaria

This draft presents difficulties substantially smaller than, for instance, those of the treaty with Italy. There are fewer disputed questions in it. There are not a few clauses in it essentially repeating the principles which have already been embodied in the Italian and Rumanian treaties, and have already served as the subject of a broad and thorough discussion at the plenary session of the Conference. This simplifies our task to a great extent, relieving us of the necessity of dwelling on questions which arose when the Italian and Rumanian treaties were discussed.

Nevertheless, in preparing the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, we encounter specific difficulties which are being aggravated by a lack of objectivity and an unfriendly attitude towards this small Slavonic country on the part of certain delegations. Suffice it to mention that, of the five States which formerly sided with Germany and with which the United Nations are about to sign peace treaties and restore peace, Bulgaria alone is in the position of a country on probation — so far, neither the U.S.A. nor Great Britain have established diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.

Up to the present the Moscow Agreement of the three Foreign Ministers of December 16-26, 1945, has not been implemented, according to which the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain undertook to recognise the Bulgarian Government as soon as they saw that it had accepted the friendly advice to include in the Government two representatives of the other democratic groups mentioned in that Agreement. This friendly advice was accepted by the Fatherland Front Government in Bulgaria, but nevertheless the above commitment with regard to the Bulgarian Government still remains unfulfilled, both by the American Government and the British Government. Up to now the Bulgarian Government has been treated by the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain as unequal and almost as under surveillance. Things have gone so far that General Robertson, the American military representative in the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria, requested the other day that a special meet-

ing of the Allied Control Commission be convened to discuss measures which, in his opinion, should be applied by the Control Commission for the conduct of "free elections" to the Grand National Assembly of Bulgaria fixed for October 27.

There is no need to analyse this step of the American military representative. Suffice it to say that General Biryuzov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, pointed out to the American General that to ensure free elections in Bulgaria was the concern of the Bulgarian Government, which had done everything necessary in this respect; and that to carry out the undertaking suggested by the American General would be nothing but a crude interference in Bulgaria's domestic affairs.

We do not believe that this is an example of the mere zeal of a general, or of his desire to win the approval of his superiors by "resolute measures" to establish in Bulgaria "freedom" of elections and other democratic blessings with which this military man decided to benefit the Bulgarian nation.

There need be no doubt that this episode belongs to a series of facts typifying the desire of the American Government, as well as the British Government, to place young, democratic Bulgaria in the position of an unequal State. Naturally, we might have glossed over facts of this sort, except that they play a part in so complex and important a matter as the preparations of a Peace Treaty determining the destinies of a State—in this case the destinies of Bulgaria—for many years to come.

But one cannot reconcile oneself to, and admit as normal, a situation in which a question concerning the Peace Treaty with a country that fell victim to the treachery of her rulers, who dragged their people into an internecine war, is made dependent on political sympathies or antipathies.

Indeed, can one recognise as correct and normal a situation in which, with persistence worthy of a better cause, Bulgaria is refused recognition as a co-belligerent country, despite the fact that, after September 9, 1944, several Bulgarian armies totalling some 400,000 officers and men fought against the German troops in Yugoslavia, and that furthermore a 100,000 strong Bulgarian army fought on the side of the United Nations in Hungary and Austria?

At the same time Italy is being recognised as a co-belligerent, although she took part in military operations with smaller armed forces at a time when the fight against Hitlerite Germany was on the order of the day.

The very fact of Bulgaria's participation in the war on the side of Germany is being appraised from an angle most unfavourable for the Bulgarian people, without reckoning with those historic conditions and facts which brought Bulgaria into the camp of the enemies of the United Nations in spite of the national traditions and interests of the Bulgarian people. There is a refusal to recall that it was the criminal gang of the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha

dynasty agents of German-Fascist imperialism, which entrenched itself on the Bulgarian throne, that dragged Bulgaria into the World War against the United Nations, which ended in disaster both for Germany and for her war allies.

There is a refusal to understand that this is the third national disaster in the past 30 years that has befallen Bulgaria because of the guilt of her criminal rulers. The war of 1912-13, the war of 1915-18, and finally the last war imposed upon the world by Hitlerite Germany, have dealt the national interests of Bulgaria blows from which it is not so easy to recover.

Bulgaria's fate is tragic. The Bulgarian people, which throughout a century has been heroically waging a struggle against foreign oppressors and for freedom and democracy, fell victim to brigand German imperialism as a result of the criminal policy of German agents who seated themselves on the throne, while the country was converted into a bridgehead for attack on peace-loving neighbouring nations.

The Bulgarian people—a Slav people—was hurled into a fight against its Slav brethren. A people which for the last 100 years struggled and sacrificed lives in an unequal fight for national emancipations, in a fight which expressed the age-long aspirations of the Bulgarian people towards national independence and democratic order, in the grip of the criminal Governments of King Ferdinand and King Boris and such German agents as Tsankov, Bagryanov, Filov and their like, was hurled into the camp of the enemies of democracy and the freedom of the nations.

This is not the Bulgarian people's guilt, but its misfortune. The Bulgarian people has to redeem the consequences of this misfortune at the cost of its own welfare.

Horace, the great poet of ancient Rome, said: *Quid-quid delinunt reges llectuntur Achai.*

("Whatever insanity the Kings commit the Achaeans pay for").

For all insanities of the Bulgarian Kings—the Bulgarian people's executioners—the Bulgarian people is paying.

The Bulgarian people is paying for the crimes of its rulers, its despicable enemies, of whom Henri Barbusse wrote with unforgettable vigour and sympathy in his book, "The Executioners," addressed to the Bulgarian people.

"Your rulers—the servants of big international businessmen—are your enemies . . . They are on the opposite side of the barricade. And those who utilise democracy as well as those who utilise patriotism to force upon you a slave discipline and disgraceful obedience are your enemies as well!"

"Your country is—you," wrote Henri Barbusse, appealing to the Bulgarian people. It is true that the Bulgarian people is the country, is Bulgaria. And at this moment it is paying for the sins, crimes and evils of its former rulers, who plunged Bulgaria into the whirlpool of war. The Bulgarian people does not protest. But it expects justice. It demands justice.

(ii) Bulgaria — People's Republic

The history of the so-called war of Bulgaria against the United Nations can best of all testify to the genuine sentiments, aspirations and deeds of the Bulgarian people, which was able to muster its energy and break away from the German-Fascist yoke, overthrow the usurpers with its own forces and means, and firmly take the path of State independence and national self-sustenance.

Under the guidance of its Fatherland Front Government, Bulgaria is carrying out a house-cleaning. It is liquidating the sad consequences of a war imposed contrary to national interests and historic traditions. Bulgaria is living through hard days owing to the sharp historic turn she has undergone within the past two years, and she will have to exert great efforts to solve this major task, to shoulder the heavy burden placed on her by history.

Bulgaria is exerting great efforts to liquidate the consequences of the criminal war. The Bulgarian people on its own initiative arrested and sternly punished the war criminals—Prince Kirill, last offspring of the Coburg dynasty, and Filov, Bagryanov, Bojilov, Daskalov, as well as others—for all the evil and suffering which they caused the Bulgarian people, peace and democracy. In February, 1945, the People's Tribunal of Bulgaria pronounced a stern verdict on these criminals, having established that between January 1, 1941, and September 9, 1944:—

1. They endangered the security of the State as well as the interests of the people by concluding international pacts with belligerent countries and by declaring war;

2. They issued instructions for the commitment of acts incompatible with neutrality with regard to the U.S.S.R., thereby worsening the international position of Bulgaria;

3. They failed to fulfil their official duties with regard to war with Britain and the United States, failing to take necessary measures in due time to safeguard the people and the State from moral and material damage;

4. They sent the Bulgarian Army to Yugoslavia and Greece to persecute the Armies of National Liberation of these countries;

5. They issued instructions on murders and beatings, burnings and tortures, and fanned these crimes in order to impose the internal and external policies which were conducted by the Government after January 1, 1941;

6. They issued instructions on the persecution of Jews;

This was said in the verdict of the Bulgarian People's Tribunal which convicted the chief Bulgarian war criminals in the name of the triumph of justice, for the sake of the interests and welfare not of the Bulgarian people alone but of all the freedom-loving peoples of the world, for the sake of the universal security of all countries of the world.

Bulgaria is taking measures to liquidate the consequences of the war in many other respects, too. She has proclaimed herself

a People's Republic, she has created a new constitution such as could only be dreamt about by the peoples of a number of countries that are boasting of having been in the camp of democracy during the war—not to mention such countries as Greece, which is lagging far behind Bulgaria and which has a lot to learn from Bulgaria as regards political, economic and social reforms and cultural progress.

All this should be borne in mind when the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria is discussed, a peace which must be just and democratic, as has been said here by the head of the Soviet delegation, V. M. Molotov.

Unfortunately a number of delegations, and that of Greece pre-eminently, as well as those influential delegations which support here the militant spirit of the Greek delegation, are apparently doing everything to prevent this peace from being just and democratic for Bulgaria.

I would like to demonstrate this by several examples, on which I shall now dwell.

(iii) Demilitarisation of the Bulgarian Frontier

We highly appraise the heroic efforts of the Greek people in the struggle for its freedom and independence. But the present issues does not concern the Greek people but the policy of the Greek Government and Greek delegation, which held forth here quite unashamedly about its aggressive plans. The entire behaviour of the Greek delegation at the Conference clearly testifies to attempts at utilising the Conference for enmity and not for peace, in order to fan sentiments of national hatred towards Bulgaria, to set public opinion in Greece against the Bulgarian people and to kindle the provocative adventurism of the "X"-ites and other chauvinists and new warmongers.

Such is the underlying motive of all those proposals and amendments that were submitted to the Conference by the Greek delegation in respect of the draft Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. Yet in spite of all the support enjoyed here by the Greek delegation from certain other delegations, and particularly the British delegation, the situation at the Conference took such an unfavourable turn for the Greek amendments that the Greek delegation was obliged to withdraw nearly all of them.

Nevertheless, two amendments remained—unjust amendments in which the Greek delegation persists. It is supported, of course, in this unjust demand by Britain, the U.S.A., and a number of their followers. Such is the amendment on the demilitarisation of the Bulgaro-Greek frontier adopted in the Military Committee by a majority of eleven votes against seven, with three abstentions. Characteristically, this proposal did not secure the two-thirds of the votes necessary to make it a recommendation.

These amendments are nothing but additional military restrictions which go beyond the decisions of the Council of Foreign

Ministers and are essentially unacceptable and unjust.

Such restrictions have not been imposed upon a single one of the former enemy countries in the Balkans, or in Finland. For incomprehensible reasons, an attempt is being made to impose such restrictions upon Bulgaria and thereby place her in an extraordinary position compared to all the other Balkan States and Finland, and to violate the principle that has been established for all these States, both when the draft peace treaties were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers and when the military restrictions imposed on these States were discussed in the Military Committee.

Bulgaria is a democratic, peace-loving and, above all, a small State. The experts of the Council of Foreign Ministers stood by the correct principle—not to impose such restrictions upon minor States. Nevertheless, the Committee, although by a majority of one vote only, adopted a decision which runs counter to the above-mentioned principle and thereby acted in an utterly wrong fashion.

Bulgaria has no frontier fortifications whatever, and this has been officially confirmed by the Greek representative in the Military Committee. Bulgaria's State frontiers are fully open and without defence. Therefore the demand for demilitarisation is in no way justified and must be rejected as devoid of any foundation.

(iv) Aggressive Plans of the Greek Government

When the first clause of the Peace Treaty was considered, the Greek delegation demanded a rectification of the Bulgarian frontier.

Demanding this so-called "rectification" of the frontier, the Greek Government of Tsaldaris is greedily stretching out its hands to other people's land. It is trying to advance as near as it thinks possible to the heart of Bulgaria, enjoying the support of certain forces that are influential in international affairs. Making use of the situation at the Peace Conference, it is trying to seize the Epirus from Albania and the valley in the Bulgarian interior to the north of it, beyond the Rhodope Mountain.

Mr. Tsaldaris and his retinue do not want to take anything into consideration in this case. Even Mr. Winston Churchill in his book "The World Crisis of 1915" (1923), was compelled to admit that the annexation of Kavalla from Bulgaria by Greece after the World War was, as came to be recognised in due time, a most unwarranted act, and that there was nothing unreasonable and ignoble in the Bulgarian demands in 1915.

That is what Churchill wrote in 1923 thus appraising the injustice caused to Bulgaria by the Peace Treaties of Neuilly, San Remo and Sevres. But now, in 1946, the Bulgarian demands have not ceased to be reasonable and noble, in spite of the vicious talk of the Greek delegation and of its protectors and shielders. To-

day there is a desire to repeat once more the injustices committed against small Slavonic countries. But those times have passed, and one can now be sure that what the diplomacy of certain countries was successfully practising 25 years ago will now meet with no success at all.

The question of the Bulgarian frontier raised by the Greeks was referred to the Military Committee and accompanied by special instructions authorising the military experts to consider this matter from a "purely military aspect, with particular reference to the degree of security that would result from transferring to Greece natural fortifications, main defence positions, the necessary depth for defensive strategic movements, and communication lines." Look how the task referred to the military experts was formulated. The task referred to the Military Committee is one very much resembling those in which usually, not peace conferences, but general staffs engage, when preparing for future battles in other people's territory. Though it might seem incredible, it is a fact. Meanwhile the mention of the defensive character of these measures should mislead no one.

The Military Committee displayed sufficient political tact to evade this task. It rejected the claims of the Greek Government. The Political and Territorial Committee for Bulgaria acted likewise, rejecting the Greek proposal by a majority of 8 votes against 2 (Greece and the Union of South Africa), with three abstentions—India, New Zealand and, alas, Great Britain—and adopting by 10 votes against one (the vote of Greece) with two abstentions (India and the Union of South Africa), the first clause as formulated by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

If after such a disgraceful fiasco the Greek delegation will decide to submit its proposal to the plenary session, it must be rejected as unjust and contradicting the tasks and aims of our Peace Conference.

(v) Torpedo Boats

The question concerning torpedo boats is already familiar to the Conference after last night's meeting, when a similar question was discussed in connection with the treaty with Rumania. The point under consideration concerns the Greek demand to prohibit Bulgaria from having torpedo boats, the number of which in Bulgaria's possession amounts to . . . seven boats.

Let us recall that the entire Bulgarian navy consists of four destroyers, two mine-sweepers, two monitors, two patrol boats and a score of motor trawlers—3,700 tons in all. What an awe-inspiring navy that is, making Mr. Tsaldaris and the entire Greek delegation tremble and demand the liquidation of this horrible menace to the security of Greece on the part of Bulgaria.

In order to make the picture still clearer we might recall that the Greek navy totals 65,000 tons and consists of several important warships—cruisers, squadron destroyers, destroyers,

submarines, corvettes, chasers, trawlers, torpedo boats, and so on.

We should remember that the Greek cruiser "Averov" alone is of 9,450 tons capacity and thereby exceeds the total capacity of the entire Bulgarian so-called navy three-fold; the Greek destroyers alone exceed by their capacity the entire so-called Bulgarian navy six-fold.

As regards Italy, by the draft Peace Treaty she is granted a navy totalling 150,000 tons, including two battleships, four cruisers, four squadron destroyers, 16 destroyers, and 20 corvettes. All these warships, in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty, are equipped with torpedo-firing apparatus exceeding by scores of times the fire-power of the Bulgarian navy. Yet the Greek delegation is in no way troubled by the presence of such a navy in the neighbourhood of Greece. But the Bulgarian navy—a navy of two destroyers and seven torpedo boats—is depriving Mr. Tsaldaris of rest, day in and day out, in Athens and in Paris, in the Committees of the Conference and at the plenary session.

The Italian navy of 150,000 tons capacity proves to be a trifle unworthy of the attention of Mr. Tsaldaris, while the Bulgarian navy of 3,700 tons—"here is where my peril lies," the Greek delegation exclaims in chorus!

Italy has 46 fighting ships, including two battleships and four cruisers. Bulgaria has 11 ships, including four destroyers and 7 torpedo boats.

We may add to this that the Bulgarian navy is stationed in The Black Sea while that of Greece is in the Aegean, and in order to threaten Greece the Bulgarian torpedo boats have to cross the Rhodope Mountains.

What then is the meaning of this dispute about the few Bulgarian torpedo boats? Why all this hue and cry at the Paris Conference?

Perhaps the statement made by the U.S. delegation in the Political Committee for Bulgaria on October 1, may shed light on these questions and it is worth recalling:

"Certain delegations have repeatedly pointed out here the progress of democratic institutions and have noted that the Bulgarian Government is planning to maintain friendly relations with Greece. These arguments have produced no impression on the U.S. delegation. On the contrary, the U.S. delegation has very serious doubts as to the development in Bulgaria of democracy as we understand it."

Let me explain that the phrase "as we understand it" would be more properly read with the addition of "in the sense of dollar democracy . . ."

But may I ask what this has to do with the Peace Treaty? Evidently the U.S. delegation is dissatisfied with Bulgarian democracy, which is not developing in the way desired by "democrats" like Petkov and Lulchev, who are so vigorously supported by the

American Government. Because of this discontent, the American delegate makes incautious statements hardly suitable for a Peace Conference and quite outside the matters the Conference is called upon to decide. But this responsibility, of course, rests entirely with the American delegation. There is only one more question for us to ask: What has this to do with the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria? Explain to us this Oedipus riddle?

(vi) Reparations from Bulgaria

I must dwell on the last question concerning reparations. How do matters stand here? I must say that the Conference is not informed of everything about this, yet it must know everything if it is properly to appraise the Greek claims.

Actually matters stand as follows. At first the Greek Government made reparation claims against Bulgaria, defined as "small," amounting to a total of 985,469,993 dollars. You see how exactly it has been done—the damages were calculated with precision to the last three dollars! Afterwards the Greek Government reduced this sum, and the new reparations claim amounted to 708,558,879 dollars. Now the Greek Government has reduced its claim to 125 million dollars. But let us bargain, Messrs. Greek delegates, and perhaps we shall bring it down to 25 millions! Now what kind of damages are these?

Here is a list which enumerates the damages sustained by Greece, on the basis of which Greece is preferring its reparations claims against Bulgaria. I shall briefly enumerate some of the items on this list.

First, "deterioration of the railway network as the result of excessive traffic." Bulgaria must pay for this no less and no more than the sum of 1,398 million drachmas. At the present rate of exchange, 118 drachmas amount to one dollar. Now, please, count how many million dollars that makes.

Second, "one gravel roller, taken by the Bulgarian Army, hauled by one horse." This is precisely stated in the Greek document.

Further we read, "another 8 rollers hauled by oxen." And for all this Mr. Tsaldaris is demanding from Bulgaria another 1,398,500,000 drachmas.

Other no less interesting items follow next: The reduction of house values which, as is said in the Greek delegation's memorandum, occurred . . . from "other reasons" besides demolitions. Evidently there may be damage for instance, from showers of rain. And this is evaluated at another 1,500 million drachmas.

Here is another item: "the difference in wages paid to Greek workers and Bulgarians," 9,000 million drachmas.

Now for another item, "from idleness of commerce," 2,000 million drachmas. Damages "from idleness of industry" are valued at about 1,000 million drachmas.

May I now ask how much will be added to the reparations

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